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(Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights 
Kathryn A. Sabbeth* 
Millions of tenants in the United States reside in substandard housing 
conditions ranging from toxic mold to the absence of heat, running water, or 
electricity. These conditions constitute blatant violations of law. The failure to 
maintain housing in habitable condition can violate the warranty of habitability, 
common law torts, and, in some cases, consumer protection and 
antidiscrimination statutes. Well-settled doctrine allows for tenants’ 
private rights of action and government enforcement. Yet the laws 
remain underenforced. 
This Article demonstrates that the reason for the underenforcement is that 
the tenants are poor. While the right to safe housing extends to all tenants, 
poor people are the most likely to get stuck in substandard conditions, 
and the enforcement of their rights is undermined precisely because of 
their social position. The Article reveals significant limitations in current 
approaches to the enforcement of poor people’s rights. The private legal 
market devalues poor tenants’ cases due to class, race, and gender biases in 
the governing doctrine. Public actors also fall short: they 
disinvest in the agencies charged with enforcing housing standards, and, 
when agency lawyers do initiate enforcement, tenants do not control the 
litigation. 
The Article envisions a new approach to enforcement of housing standards. 
It identifies specific ways to expand enforcement by market actors, 
government agencies, and non-profits. Given the relative strengths of the 
public and private sectors, a combination of the following approaches is likely 
to be most effective: (1) strengthening support for private enforcement through 
legislative reform that enhances fee-shifting and aggregation of claims; (2) 
increasing agency funds and shifting agency culture to promote zealous 
government enforcement; and (3) appointing counsel for tenants who wish to 
bring cases or intervene in suits brought by government actors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of families in the United States reside in substandard conditions that 
resemble what you might expect to find in a much poorer nation.1
See Umair Haque, Why America is the World’s First Poor Rich Country, EUDAIMONIA (May 23, 
2018), https://eand.co/why-america-is-the-worlds-first-poor-rich-country-17f5a80e444a (“America is 
pioneering a new kind of poverty. . . . It’s not absolute poverty like Somalia, and it’s not just relative 
poverty, like in gilded banana republics. It’s a uniquely American creation.”). 
 Across rural and 
urban areas,2
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. HOUS. SURVEY 2017, https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html#?s_areas=a00000&s_year=n2017&s_tableName=Table
5&s_byGroup1=a1&s_byGroup2=a1&s_filterGroup1=t3&s_filterGroup2=g4&s_show=S (click “Get 
Table”) (presenting data on inadequate rental units in rural regions and metropolitan centers). 
 zones recognized as “blighted,”3 and trendy neighborhoods flush 
1. 
2 . 
3. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive
Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 306–15 (2004) (collecting and critiquing definitions of 
“blight”); Patricia Hureston Lee, Shattering ‘Blight’ and the Hidden Narratives That Condemn, 42 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 29, 43–48 (2017) (examining history and etymology of “blight” terminology).  
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with the markers of gentrification,4
See, e.g., Tarry Hum, Illegal Conversions and South Brooklyn’s Affordable Housing Crisis, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.gothamgazette.com/authors/130-opinion/6532-illegal-
conversions-and-south-brooklyn-s-affordable-housing-crisis. 
 landlords5 rent out residential property that 
lacks heat, running water, reliable electricity, or stable flooring. 6  Toxic mold 
covers walls and ceilings.7 At night, tenants and their children try to sleep with 
insects crawling over their skin and the sounds of rats gnawing on furniture.8 Some 
landlords perform maintenance for white tenants but not tenants of color.9 Some 
threaten to call immigration enforcement when undocumented tenants request 
repairs.10
See Gary Rhoades, New California Law Provides Protections for Immigrant Tenants, SANTA 
MONICA DAILY PRESS (June 13, 2018), https://www.smdp.com/new-california-law-creates-protections-
for-immigrant-tenants/166756 (explaining “landlords aware of the [ICE] crackdown see it as creating a 
new vulnerability so a tenant will never complain or assert her housing rights”). The interference of 
immigration enforcement with enforcement of civil and economic rights underscores that enforcement and 
underenforcement reflect political priorities. See Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney 
General, A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 
309 (critiquing “prioritization of immigration enforcement over the civil rights of undocumented 
workers”). 
 Landlords rent only to tenants too vulnerable to complain11 or selectively 
ignore the tenants they deem undesirable.12  
These conditions constitute blatant violations of law. The failure to maintain 
housing in habitable condition can violate the warranty of habitability, common 
law torts, and, in some cases, consumer protection and antidiscrimination 
                                                                                                                         
4 . 
5. The “landlord-tenant relationship” is that between “the lessor and lessee of real estate.” Landlord-
Tenant Relationship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1050 (11th ed. 2019). This Article will use the terms 
“landlord” and “owner” interchangeably. Some states define the term “landlord” more broadly, including 
not only an owner but also any rental management company or other agent responsible for maintaining a 
rental property in habitable condition. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-40(3), 42–42 (2018).  
6. See infra Part II.A.1 and accompanying notes. 
7. See infra Part II.A.1 and accompanying notes. 
8. See infra Part II.A.1 and accompanying notes. 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 39 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (finding evidence of 
a “systematic practice or policy to deprive black Americans of rights guaranteed under the Fair Housing 
Act,” including refusal to conduct maintenance and use of racial slurs in response to repair requests); see 
also infra pp. 116–18 and accompanying notes (describing claims for discriminatory failure to provide 
maintenance services). 
10. 
11. See Philip M.E. Garboden & Eva Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use the Threat of Eviction, 
18 CITY & CMTY. 638, 641 (2019) (“Landlords understand that tenants who are behind on their rent are 
less likely to advocate for their legal rights regarding housing quality and code enforcement.”). Matthew 
Desmond describes the strategy of landlords who exploit poor neighborhoods. See MATTHEW DESMOND, 
EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 151–52 (2016). They purchase properties with 
depressed values, derive significant profits from rental income, and neglect upkeep without concern for the 
deleterious effects on the value of the real estate. Id. As one owner explained, “You don’t buy properties 
for their appreciative value. You’re not in it for the future but for now.” Id. at 152. 
12. See, e.g., Martinez v. Optimus Props., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-03581-SVW-MRW, 2018 WL 6039875, 
at *1, *10 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2018) (finding plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence that landlord denied 
services to Latinx families as part of harassment strategy “because [the landlord] wanted these tenants to 
move out”). While this Article focuses on substandard housing, the description of owners’ misconduct 
should not be interpreted to suggest that all owners in engage in such activity. There are, of course, many 
decent landlords who attend to their tenants and properties with care. What has changed in the past half-
century, however, is that the rental of property has grown from a side activity into big business, and the 
new model is driven by profit. See DESMOND, supra note 11, at 28 (describing how “housing had become 
a business”); infra note 180 and sources therein (describing regulation that encourages “financialization” 
of housing). 
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statutes.13 Well-settled doctrine allows for tenants’ private rights of action and 
government enforcement.14 Yet the laws remain underenforced.  
The gap between the right to safe housing and the reality of dangerous 
conditions has received relatively little attention. In the 1970s, when courts first 
recognized the implied warranty of habitability, a related literature developed,15 
but that discussion addressed social welfare and economic theory more than legal 
entitlements. 16  Since then, public health experts have documented the harms 
imposed by substandard housing,17 and some legal scholars have articulated bold 
arguments for “health justice,”18
See, e.g., Emily Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for the Elimination of Health 
Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 AM. U.L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2015); Angela P. Harris & Aysha Pamukcu, The 
Civil Rights of Health: A New Approach to Challenging Structural Inequality, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 42–43, 484–49), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3350597 (summarizing 
“health justice” literature).  
 but neither group has focused on enforcement of 
established legal rights. Several law review articles have considered the warranty 
of habitability as a subject for empirical study, particularly as a defense in eviction 
actions for nonpayment of rent.19
See Paula A. Franzese et al., The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise 
of Landlord-Tenant Reform, 29 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 1, 5 (2016) (describing empirical study of nonpayment 
actions and concluding that the warranty of habitability is rarely invoked); Nicole Summers, The Limits of 
Good Law: A Study of Housing Court Outcomes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5–
6, 18–23), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3387752 (documenting “warranty of 
habitability operationalization gap” through empirical study of nonpayment cases, and summarizing prior 
literature); cf. Michele Cotton, When Judges Don’t Follow the Law: Research and Recommendations, 19 
CUNY L. REV. 57, 62–64 (2015) (describing qualitative study of affirmative litigation by pro se tenants 
seeking repairs, and referencing prior studies); Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: 
An Empirical Look at a Housing Court Experiment, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058, 1060–63 (2017) 
(describing an informal, specialized court where pro se tenants can seek repairs but are jurisdictionally 
barred from seeking further relief).  
 They have not, however, framed the warranty of 
habitability as (just one in a set of claims) well-suited for affirmative enforcement 
litigation.20 Prior consideration of the underenforcement of housing standards has 
highlighted failures of housing code enforcement agencies21 or limits on the utility 
                                                                                                                         
13. See infra Part II.B.1 (identifying causes of action); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, Convergence 
in Contort: Landlord Liability for Defective Premises in Comparative Perspective, 85 TUL. L. REV. 413, 
417 (2011) (“[T]he fact that landlord-tenant relations, like many consumer protection regimes, are 
governed by an amalgam of contract, property, administrative, tort, and occasionally, constitutional law, 
makes them particularly difficult to study. . . .”). 
14. See infra Part II.B.1. This Article focuses on private, unsubsidized housing. Additional claims 
and mechanisms for enforcement are available in public housing and subsidized, private housing.  
15. See Matthew Desmond & Monica Bell, Housing, Poverty, and the Law, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 15, 21–22 (2015) (noting that “scholarly attention regrettably has shifted away from code 
enforcement” since the 1970s). 
16. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing 
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Ezra Rosser, 
Rural Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 33, 40–41 (2006) (collecting literature and describing debates that followed 
Ackerman’s article). 
17 . See Emily Benfer & Allyson Gold, There’s No Place Like Home: Reshaping Community 
Interventions and Policies to Eliminate Environmental Hazards and Improve Population Health for Low-
Income and Minority Communities, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S1, S2-S15 (2017) (collecting literature).  
18. 
19. 
20. Compare sources cited supra note 19, with infra Part II.B.1 (describing rights and remedies). 
21. See infra notes 261–263 and accompanying text. 
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of the warranty of habitability.22 This Article seeks to offer a broader theoretical 
analysis of underenforcement and the possibilities for correcting it.23    
The Article proposes thinking about enforcement in a new way. It argues that 
the reason for the enforcement gap in substandard housing is that the tenants are 
poor.24  
Although some scholars use the terms “low-income” and “low-wealth,” this Article embraces the 
language of “poor people,” borrowing from poor people’s social movements. See, e.g., FRANCES FOX 
PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 
(1964); William Barber II & Liz Theoharris, It’s Time to Fight for America’s Soul, TIME (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://time.com/5048917/poor-peoples-campaign-martin-luther-king (describing the “Poor People’s 
Campaign of 1968” and today’s “Poor People’s Campaign: A National Call for a Moral Revival”); see also 
Gawain Kripke, Poor vs. Low-Income: Which Term Should We Use?, OXFAM: THE POLITICS OF POVERTY 
(Jan. 15, 2015), https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2015/01/poor-versus-low-income-what-term-
should-we-use (“The use of the word [poor] sounds archaic, even medieval – rigidly classist and 
fatalistic. ‘The poor’ often denotes a great, undifferentiated mass. Something about it conveys the idea that 
poverty is immovable, like an historical legacy that we must endure, but never overcome. . . . But after a 
while, I started wondering, ‘What am I trying to hide?’). This Article defines poverty in terms of the 
financial inability to cover the necessities of modern life and manage unexpected emergencies without 
tumbling into dire circumstances. See Haque, supra note 1 (“It is something like living at the knife’s edge, 
constantly being on the brink of ruin, one small step away from catastrophe and disaster, ever at the risk of 
falling through the cracks.”). The definition intentionally includes some people above the federal poverty 
guidelines to account for the reality that the guidelines are extremely low when compared with costs of 
living. See id. (describing “massive inflation for the basics of life”); Louis Uchitelle, How to Define 
Poverty? Let Us Count the Ways, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/26/arts/how-
to-define-poverty-let-us-count-the-ways.html (collecting definitions of poverty and critiques of federal 
guidelines).  
While the right to safe housing extends to all tenants, poor people are the 
most likely to get stuck in dangerous housing,25 and enforcement is undermined 
precisely because of their social position.26  
The Article reveals significant limitations in current approaches to 
enforcement of poor people’s rights. The private legal market devalues poor 
people’s cases due to class, race, and gender biases in the basic doctrines of 
contracts and torts.27 Public actors also fall short: they disinvest in the protection 
of poor people’s interests, 28  and, when government lawyers do engage in 
enforcement, affected individuals do not control the litigation.29  
The Article concludes by proposing a set of solutions.30 It identifies specific 
ways to support enforcement by market actors and government agencies. It also 
offers an idea for a public-private hybrid: appointed counsel for affirmative 
representation of tenants. 
Encouragingly, the current political environment appears ripe for such reform. 
Within the past three years, affordable housing has attracted significant interest 
                                                                                                                         
22. See, e.g., David Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CAL. L. 
REV. 389, 392–97, 458–61 (2011) (analyzing the warranty of habitability as an example of the “failed” 
“legal revolutions” of the 1960s). 
23. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006) 
(analyzing underenforcement of criminal laws). 
24. 
25. See infra Part II.A.2. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See infra Part III.A.2. 
28. See infra Part III.B.1. 
29. See infra Part III.B.2. 
30. See infra Part IV.C. 
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from policymakers and popular media. The “Movement for Black Lives”31
See About Us, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/about (last visited Nov. 20, 
2019). 
 and 
“Fight for $15” 32
See FIGHT FOR $15, https://fightfor15.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
 have highlighted rising rents, 33
See Gabrielle Gurley, Black Lives Matter Plunges Into the Affordable Housing Crisis, THE AM. 
PROSPECT (Sept. 2, 2016), https://prospect.org/article/black-lives-matter-plunges-affordable-housing-
crisis; Fight for $15, FACEBOOK (Mar. 30, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.facebook.com/Fightfor15/ 
photos/a.591503887546999/2400771719953531/?type=3&theater (“Since 1960, our rent has more than 
doubled. Our incomes? Up only 5%.”). 
 while a new tenants’ rights 
movement has seized the attention of politicians and begun accumulating 
remarkable legislative victories.34
See J. David Goodman et al., Titans of Real Estate in ‘Shock’ Over New York Rent Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/landlord-rent-protection-
regulation.html; Sofie Kasakove, The Tenants’ Rights Movement is Expanding Beyond Big Cities, NEW 
REPUBLIC (May 17, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/153929/tenants-rights-movement-expanding-
beyond-big-cities; Jimmy Tobias, A New Housing-Rights Movement Has the Real-Estate Industry Running 
Scared, THE NATION (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/a-new-housing-rights-movement-
has-the-real-estate-industry-running-scared. 
 The bestseller, Evicted,35 spawned an exhibit at 
the National Building Museum,36
Evicted, NAT. BLDG. MUSEUM, https://www.nbm.org/exhibition/evicted (last visited Nov. 19, 
2019). 
 a multi-part series on public radio,37 
Virginia Prescott & La’Raven Taylor, The New Scarlet Letter, E: NPR’s ‘On the Media’ 
Investigates America’s Eviction Crisis, GEO. PUB. BROAD. (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.gpbnews.org/post/new-scarlet-letter-e-nprs-media-investigates-americas-eviction-crisis.  
and a crop 
of new scholarship.38 Although housing policy in the United States has historically 
prioritized homeowners,39 elected officials at the highest levels of government 
have started to take notice of rental housing. 40
See, e.g., Jacob Passy, Where the 2020 Presidential Candidates, Including Elizabeth Warren and 
Bernie Sanders, Stand on Affordable Housing, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-where-2020-presidential-candidates-including-elizabeth-
warren-and-kamala-harris-stand-on-affordable-housing-2019-07-25 (describing presidential candidates’ 
proposals to reduce rent burdens, with some including funds for building affordable housing or appointing 
lawyers for tenants facing eviction). 
 Responding to tenants’ rights 
activism and buttressed by empirical evidence on the effects of eviction, local and 
state governments have initiated programs to appoint eviction defense lawyers.41
See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 55 
(2018) (describing and analyzing the nation’s first statutory right to eviction defense counsel); NAT’L 
COALITION FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, http://civilrighttocounsel.org/map (select “Eviction” from 
dropdown options) (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (providing updates on state and local laws expanding the 
right to eviction defense counsel). 
 
The effort to address eviction is long overdue. Yet preventing formal displacement 
is only part of the story.42 The law guarantees poor tenants not only procedural 





35. See DESMOND, supra note 11. 
36. 
37 . 
38. See Garboden & Rosen, supra note 11, at 658–61 (collecting literature). 




42. See Matthew Desmond, Carl Gershenson & Barbara Kiviat, Forced Mobility and Residential 
Instability Among Urban Renters, 89 SOC. SERV. REV. 227, 246, 253, 255-56 (2015) (describing 
displacement due to substandard conditions); see also Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction 
of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOC. 88, 95 (2012) (explaining that “court records do not capture informal 
evictions—from illegal strong-arm lockouts to unofficial agreements”). 
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rights that serve to prevent the sudden loss of a home 43 but also substantive 
standards that ensure homes are fit for human habitation.44  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A presents the phenomenon of unsafe 
rental housing. It describes the harms imposed by substandard conditions, 
particularly the physical, emotional, cognitive, and economic damage to 
individuals, families, and communities. It then explains why people live in these 
conditions.  
Part II.B introduces the framework of legal rights. Poor people’s interests are 
often viewed as needs, which can be met voluntarily in the spirit of charity, rather 
than as rights that can be demanded.45 Yet tenants’ right to safe housing is clear.46 
Although there may not be a universal right to housing at government expense, 
people who occupy the status of “tenants” are entitled to habitable residences.47 
Part II concludes by responding to possible concerns that enforcing tenants’ rights 
could be counterproductive.48 
Part III turns to why the right to safe housing is underenforced. Part III.A 
examines the private market. Although some private, for-profit firms do engage in 
public interest litigation,49 the private legal market has not supplied lawyers to 
enforce poor tenants’ right to safe housing. This is for at least three reasons. First, 
poor tenants cannot pay lawyers to represent them at current market rates. 50 
Second, poor tenants cannot rely on contingency fee mechanisms to attract private 
counsel because, under current approaches to the law of torts and contracts, 
damages are proportional to social position. The prevailing methods for calculating 
damages incorporate biases of class, race, and gender, and they underestimate the 
value of poor tenants’ cases.51 Third, although Congress has created fee-shifting 
statutes to support cases devalued in the private market, the Supreme Court has 
undercut the fee-shifting device.52 
Part III.B shows why public agencies have also fallen short. First, the poor too 
often lack political power,53 and so underenforcement of poor tenants’ rights is the 
norm.54 Second, even with gains in political power, government enforcement is 
limited as a means of access to justice because the tenant is not the client.55 The 
                                                                                                                         
43. A major goal of new laws providing appointed counsel in evictions has been the prevention of 
homelessness. See Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 86–89 (describing legislative history). 
44. See also JOAN C. TRONTO, CARING DEMOCRACY: MARKETS, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE ix (2013) 
(critiquing liberal democracies that offer “mere life”).   
45. See Deborah Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 737, 743 (2002) (arguing that “justice [for poor people] is increasingly a function of charity 
rather than a right under the Rule of Law”). 
46. See infra Part II.B.1. 
47. See infra Part II.B.2. 
48. See infra Part II.B.3. 
49. See infra notes 187–189, 193 and accompanying text. 
50. See infra Part III.A.1. 
51. See infra Part III.A.2. 
52. See infra Part III.A.3. 
53. See, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II, A Constitutional Path to Fair Representation for the Poor, 66 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 921, 923–24 (2018). 
54. See infra Part III.B.1 and sources cited therein.  
55. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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agency lawyer represents a government entity or the people at large.56 Government 
enforcement of housing standards does not generally obtain monetary relief for 
individual tenants, even though they may have paid rent and be entitled to recover 
it.57 Tenants also do not direct the litigation.58 They do not get to choose, for 
example, whether or not to pursue enforcement actions, even if those actions could 
result in the bulldozing of their homes.59 In sum, the public and private sectors 
have left a gap in the enforcement of poor tenants’ rights.  
Part IV takes up the challenge of assessing the implications of this enforcement 
gap and offering solutions. Part IV.A demonstrates that the enforcement gap 
systematically excludes poor tenants from access to the legal system and 
“underdevelops”60 the law in areas where it could protect them. Part IV.B argues 
that legislators can and should respond. First, governments possess moral duties 
and practical incentives to protect public welfare. Second, government actors have 
constructed the enforcement gap through legislative, executive, and judicial 
decisions, and therefore governments bear the responsibility of addressing that 
gap. Third, governments enjoy unique opportunities, and carry unique obligations, 
to protect the rule of law. 
The Article concludes by offering policymakers a set of public and private 
approaches to filling the enforcement gap. These include: (1) a public approach of 
shifting agency culture and increasing agency funds to promote zealous 
government enforcement;61 (2) a public-private hybrid of appointing counsel for 
tenants who wish to bring cases or intervene in suits brought by government 
actors; 62  and (3) a market-based approach of enhancing fee-shifting and 
aggregation of claims to support enforcement by for-profit actors.63 Given the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the public and private sectors,64 adopting a 
combination of these approaches will be most effective. 
II. HOUSING VIOLATIONS 
The phenomenon of dangerous housing is experienced primarily by poor 
people who lack alternatives. This Part explains why they get stuck in these 
circumstances and describes the injuries that result. It then turns to legal rights. 
Multiple sources of law forbid substandard housing conditions. Tenants are legally 
entitled to demand that their landlords conduct repairs and compensate them for 
any harm. Statutes also authorize various government actors to enforce housing 
standards. Yet too often poor tenants live in substandard housing without relief. 
                                                                                                                         
56. See W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump Administration, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 
275, 301–02 (2017) (collecting literature defining client of government lawyer). 
57. See infra Part II.B.2. 
58. See infra Part III.B.2.; see also Eugene R. Gaetke & Robert G. Schwemm, Government Lawyers 
and Their Private “Clients” Under the Fair Housing Act, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 338–40 (1997) 
(explaining that victims of housing discrimination do not control government enforcement because they 
are not the clients of agency lawyers).  
59. See infra notes 131, 285 and accompanying text. 
60. See infra Part IV.A (describing underdevelopment of law protecting poor tenants). 
61. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
62. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
63. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
64. See infra Part III. 
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A. Dangerous Homes 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, more than 3.3 million families live in 
substandard rental units.65
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. HOUS. SURVEY 2017, https://www.census.gov/programs- 
surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas=00000&s_year=2017&s_tablename=TABLE1
&s_bygroup1=1&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergroup1=1&s_filtergroup2=1 (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (click 
“Get Table”) (documenting more than 3.3 million “severely or moderately inadequate” rental homes); see also 
id. app. at A17-A18, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/2017/2017%20AHS%20Definitions.pdf?# 
(describing categories of housing adequacy and listing methods for categorizing housing as “severely inadequate” or 
“moderately inadequate”). This figure likely underrepresents the scale of the problem, because census data 
undercounts renters. See Michele Gilman & Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme 
Privacy and Data Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 257–58 (2018). Other sources 
estimate much higher numbers of families in substandard homes but do not distinguish between rentals and 
owner-occupied units. See TRACEY ROSS ET AL., CTR. AM. PROGRESS, CREATING SAFE AND HEALTHY 
LIVING ENVIRONMENTS FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 1 (2016), 
https://www.issuelab.org/resource/creating-safe-and-healthy-living-environments-for-low-income-
families.html (“[M]ore than 30 million housing units in the United States have significant physical or health 
hazards, such as dilapidated structures, poor heating, damaged plumbing, gas leaks, or lead.”). 
 This subpart draws on prior research to describe the 
harms that result. It explains how substandard conditions damage the physical, 
emotional, cognitive, and economic well-being of individuals and communities.  
1. Substandard Life  
The impact of residing in substandard conditions can be life-altering. Poor air 
quality leads to respiratory illnesses like asthma.66 Absence of heat and running 
water necessary for washing spreads influenza, coughs, colds, and related 
illnesses. 67  Missing floor boards result in falls and broken bones. 68  Insect 
infestation and bites result in itchiness, rashes, and infections, and can cause severe 
allergic reactions like anaphylaxis.69 Electrical fires have resulted in deaths.70 
The cognitive and psychological impacts are no less troubling. With chronic 
coughing from air not fit to breathe, 71  the sounds of rodents gnawing and 
scratching furniture,72 and insects crawling over occupants at night,73
See generally U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, JOINT STATEMENT 
ON BED BUG CONTROL IN THE U.S. FROM THE U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC) AND ENVTL 
PROT. AGENCY (EPA) (2010), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/21750. 
 the victims 
of such conditions suffer from sleep deprivation. 74  Their concentration and 
performance at school and work falter. 75  Substandard conditions create an 
                                                                                                                         
65 . 
66. See, e.g., David Mudarri & William J. Fisk, Public Health and Economic Impact of Dampness 
and Mold, 17 INDOOR AIR 227, 229, 232–35 (2007). 
67. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO 
PROMOTE HEALTHY HOMES vii (2009) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL CALL]. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See, e.g., DESMOND supra note 11, at 199–201; MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 71–72. 
71. See Mudarri & Fisk, supra note 66, at 227, 229, 232–35. 
72. See SURGEON GENERAL CALL, supra note 67, at 31.  
73. 
74. Id. at 3 (explaining “bites usually occur when people are sleeping” and one potential consequence 
is “insomnia”). 
75. See Samiya A. Bashir, Home Is Where the Harm Is: Inadequate Housing as a Public Health Crisis, 92 
AM. J. PUB. HEATH 733, 733 (2002) (noting neurological, psychological, and behavioral problems caused by 
substandard housing); REBEKAH LEVINE COLEY ET AL., MACARTHUR FOUND., POOR QUALITY HOUSING IS 
TIED TO CHILDREN’S EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS, (2013), 
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https://www.macfound.org/media/files/HHM_-
_Poor_Quality_Housing_Is_Tied_to_Childrens_Emotional_and_Behavioral_Problems.pdf (identifying 
emotional and behavioral problems in children and diminished academic skills in teens); Robert G. Healy, Effects 
of Improved Housing on Worker Performance, 6 J. HUM. RES. 297, 304 (1967) (suggesting work performance 
improved with improved housing conditions). 
76. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, 
AND TORT LAW 140 (2010). 
77. See Allyson E. Gold, No Home for Justice: How Eviction Perpetuates Health Inequity Among 
Low-Income and Minority Tenants, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 59, 60 (2016) (“People spend 
more time in their homes than in any other location.”). 
78. See Ernie Hood, Dwelling Disparities: How Poor Housing Leads to Poor Health, 113 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. A311, A313 (2005) (noting relationship between social isolation and substandard 
housing); Franzese et al., supra note 19, at 25–26 (describing social impact of bug infestation). 
79. See DESMOND, supra note 11, at 199–201. 
80. See Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 64–65 (summarizing literature). 
81. Id. 
82. While the sanctity of the home may be threatened by other causes as well, such as violent family 
members, police activity, or child welfare caseworkers, the ideal of the home as a sanctuary persists. 
83. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 54–60 (describing the “alienation” created when 
“many people experience their housing as just another precarious place in a precarious world”). 
84. See Mudarri & Fisk, supra note 66, at 228 (noting one study estimates that “there is an economic 
consequence from dampness and mold due to asthma alone that is in the range of billions of dollars per 
year”). 
85. 
environment unconducive to productivity. They can also cause direct harm to 
human cognitive capacities. For example, exposure to lead paint can cause 
permanent injuries to a child’s nervous system or brain.76   
Living night and day77 in substandard conditions is demoralizing. Residents in 
substandard housing experience shame and social isolation. 78  They develop 
anxiety and depression.79 Home is supposed to be a place of comfort and safety.80 
Security in one’s home is basic to a sense of self and a sense of place.81 Given the 
emotional support that home is supposed to provide,82 to experience anxiety and 
depression in one’s home—precisely because of the condition of the home—can 
be deeply unsettling.83  
Unsafe housing also results in economic harm. Out-of-pocket costs can include 
medical expenses; 84  replacement of furniture, clothing, and other possessions 
destroyed by mold or water damage; 85
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION 
ENV’TS DIV., A BRIEF GUIDE TO MOLD, MOISTURE, AND YOUR HOME 7 (2010), 
https://www.epa.gov/mold/brief-guide-mold-moisture-and-your-home (describing difficulty of repairing 
damaged possessions and advising disposal instead); Franzese et al., supra note 19, at 26 (describing 
tenants’ disposal of furniture and clothing); Cotton, supra note 19, at 80 (describing tenants’ replacement 
of furniture). 
 and repair expenses. 86  Even more 
significant is the damage to academic and employment performance—school 
behavior, academic achievements, job qualifications, and work abilities—and the 
diminished earnings that result.87  
These harms for individuals result in broader consequences for society. They 
restrict avenues to participate and succeed in civic life, which limits individuals’ 
abilities to support their families and communities, as well as to thrive personally. 
86. See, e.g., DESMOND, supra note 11, at 72–74 (“After two months without a working bathtub or sink 
and with a barely working toilet, Doreen decided to a call a plumber herself. . . . The plumber charged $150. . 
. .”); Franzese et al., supra note 19, at 36 (describing tenants paying for repairs); Cotton, supra note 19, at 80 
(describing tenant paying for repairs). 
87. See supra note 75; see also infra Part III.A.2 (explaining calculation of economic damages). 
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Substandard housing can cause affected individuals and family members to rely 
on public subsidies, including emergency rooms, disability insurance, and public 
assistance, which can strain public resources.88 Child welfare agencies remove 
children from their parents or delay family reunification as a consequence of 
inadequate housing.89 Because substandard housing is experienced primarily by 
poor people and disproportionately by families of color,90 the harms of substandard 
housing also exacerbate health, wealth, and income inequality. 
2. Why People Live There 
A reasonable question is why people live in such conditions. Particularly given 
the dangers to tenants’ health and that of their children, one might expect them to 
pack up and move. Yet there are multiple, reinforcing reasons why they get stuck. 
People with the resources to leave generally do not rent such properties in the first 
place. White, middle-and upper-class individuals are more likely than poor people 
and people of color to own their homes and thereby avoid the risks of renting.91 
When they do rent, people with social advantages have more options of where to 
do so.  
A constellation of social and economic factors limits the housing choices of 
poor people. Individuals who need to leave a previous residence in a rush—
because of domestic violence, eviction, or other crisis92—may not immediately 
notice substandard conditions.93 They also may be unable to find alternatives. This 
can be due to segregation and discrimination, damaged credit, a criminal record, a 
prior eviction, undocumented status and the absence of a social security number, 
or simply the unavailability of affordable housing.94 All of these factors hit people 
of color, particularly women with children, hardest.95 
                                                                                                                         
88. See Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 68–69 (collecting sources). 
89. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 21, 35 (2002) 
(emphasizing that inadequate housing is a particularly significant factor in the separation of Black families, 
while child welfare agencies more often give white families housing assistance). 
90. See infra notes 91, 93, 95, 97, 100, 109, 110, 112–119 and accompanying text. 
91. See Rachel C. Bratt et al., Why a Right to Housing is Needed and Makes Sense: an Editors’ 
Introduction, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 1, 4 (Rachel G. Bratt 
et al., eds., 2006) [hereinafter A RIGHT TO HOUSING] (highlighting “enormous racial disparities that exist 
in home-ownership rates”); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY 
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 59–67, 70–73 (2017) (describing federal policies that 
financially supported home ownership for whites only); Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential 
Segregation in Promoting and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 
1205–09 (2001) (describing how property ownership patterns exacerbate wealth inequality); Florence 
Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 669 (2002) 
(“[M]inorities are disadvantaged with respect to [homeownership, which] is for most middle-class 
households in the United States the greatest source of household wealth.”). 
92. See Desmond et al., supra note 42, at 245-46 (documenting reasons for “forced moves”); id. at 
249-51 (using regression model to show that a forced move “significantly increases the likelihood that a 
renter will experience long-term housing [conditions] problems such as broken appliances, exposed wires, 
or no heat”). 
93. See Benfer & Gold, supra note 17, at S20 (noting “prospective tenants . . . may not discover a 
hazard until it causes injury”).  
94. See infra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.  
95. See Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 90–95 (synthesizing literature). 
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Once in the unit, tenants might believe that the owner will make repairs. 
Landlords frequently make promises they fail to honor.96 They might make repairs 
for relatively privileged tenants but ignore repeated complaints from poor 
tenants.97  
Leaving without the landlord’s permission might require breaking a lease. The 
landlord could threaten to damage the tenant’s credit if they stop paying rent. 
Paying rent for both the old apartment and a new one is unrealistic for most tenants, 
especially poor tenants who live in substandard housing precisely because they 
cannot afford alternatives. A tenant with leverage might be able to negotiate an 
early lease termination. The tenant can argue that the landlord’s failure to maintain 
the premises constitutes constructive eviction, which releases the tenant from the 
obligation to pay rent.98 Yet tenants without counsel might not know about their 
rights under constructive eviction doctrine,99 or they might find it challenging to 
negotiate with their landlords. Empirical evidence demonstrates that women and 
people of color face special obstacles in negotiation.100 
See DESMOND, supra note 11, at 364 n.11 (“[B]ecause of the powerful ways gender guides 
interaction, . . . a woman who aggressively confronted a landlord commonly was branded rude or out of 
line.”); Desmond, supra note 42, at 112–13 (explaining that men outnumber women almost 3 to 1 among 
landlords, and “having been socialized to the rhythms and postures of masculinity,” male tenants were 
more prepared than female tenants to negotiate with their male landlords); Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 93 
n.300 (“Particularly given the prevalence of sexual harassment in housing, it is understandable that female 
tenants might want to steer clear of any conduct that could be misinterpreted or used as an opening for such 
harassment.”); see also Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Social Incentives for Gender Differences in the 
Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes it Does Hurt to Ask, 103 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 84, 99–100 (2007) (demonstrating that women face greater resistance than men when they ask 
for higher compensation and, if women ask, male evaluators are less inclined to work with them in the 
future); Morela Hernandez & Derek R. Avery, Getting the Short End of the Stick: Racial Bias in Salary 
Negotiations, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (June 15, 2016), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/getting-the-
short-end-of-the-stick-racial-bias-in-salary-negotiations (documenting that Black job seekers were rated as 
“pushier” than whites and therefore obtained worse results). 
Further, landlords may 
refuse to negotiate if they can instead exploit tenants’ vulnerable position.101 
A major reason tenants do not leave bad conditions is the absence of 
somewhere to go. The same factors that cause people to move in will later prevent 
                                                                                                                         
96. See DESMOND, supra note 11, at 76. 
97. See Marilyn L. Uzdavines, Barking Dogs: Code Enforcement is All Bark and No Bite (Unless the 
Inspectors Have Assault Rifles), 54 WASHBURN L.J. 161, 164 (2014); Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1729 
(citing H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, 6 ABA J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L. 29, 35 (1996)). 
98. See Donald E. Campbell, Forty (Plus) Years After the Revolution: Observations on the Implied 
Warranty of Habitability, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 793, 798–99 (2013) (describing development 
of constructive eviction doctrine). 
99. This author has counseled tenants whose primary goal prior to the consultation was simply 
permission to leave. They did not know they had a right to do so. 
100. 
101. See DESMOND, supra note 11, at 306 (“[W]e have neglected the critical ways that exploitation 
contributes to the persistence of poverty. We have overlooked a fact that landlords never have: there is a 
lot of money to be made off the poor.”). 
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them from moving out. 102 The most basic obstacle to relocating is the shortage of 
affordable housing.103
See Sarah Holder, Minimum Wage Still Can’t Pay for a Two-Bedroom Apartment Anywhere, CITYLAB 
(June 19, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/06/affordable-housing-minimum-wage-rent-apartment-
house-rental/592024; Will Parker, Apartment Demand Hits Five-Year High, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/apartment-demand-hits-five-year-high-11561917600?fbclid=IwAR1rF-
6hPQoXt_T5x95_VLLtSph1lFlEHtSmliCaXsD1g5pW2ylJflPk85s. 
 Across the country, incomes do not cover rising rents.104  
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., MILLIONS OF AMERICANS BURDENED BY 
HOUSING COSTS IN 2015 (2015), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/son2017-housing-cost-burdens-table; NAT’L 
LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2019 16–6 (2019), 
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2019.pdf; David Montgomery, The Neighborhoods Where 
Housing Costs Devour Budgets, CITYLAB (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/04/affordable-
housing-map-monthly-rent-home-mortgage-budget/586330. 
Inadequate income presents a problem when applying for a new rental. The 
new landlord may require proof of income three times the rent.105 
See Nick Fitzpatrick, The Income You Need to Rent an Apartment, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/axiometrics/2016/04/22/the-income-you-need-to-rent-an-
apartmen/#6081f653140d (“The general rule of thumb in the apartment industry is that a potential renter’s 
gross income should be three times the cost of the lease.”).  
Although some 
might perceive this to be a pretense for race and class discrimination, three-to-one 
is not an unreasonable ratio for income to housing costs.106
See Kathleen Elkins, Here’s How Much of Your Income You Should Be Spending on Housing, 
MAKE IT (June 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/how-much-of-your-income-you-should-be-
spending-on-housing.html. 
 Indeed, economists 
have long held that a maximum of one-third of a family budget should be devoted 
to housing, including utilities.107
See MARY SCHWARTZ & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO CAN AFFORD TO LIVE 
IN A HOME?: A LOOK AT DATA FROM THE 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1–2, 
https://www.census.gov/housing/census/publications/who-can-afford.pdf. 
 The problem is that many households today need 
more than half of their income to cover their rent.108 
Income requirements are not the only criteria that disqualify rental applicants. 
Landlords may exclude applicants based on a prior criminal conviction 109  or 
eviction.110 The filing of an eviction lawsuit, regardless of its merits, can land a 
tenant on a private “blacklist,” which landlords use to weed out applicants.111 
                                                                                                                         
102. See Desmond et al., supra note 42, at 257 (“If we wish to understand why some low-income 
families live in decidedly worse housing units than others . . . a significant part of the answer may lie in 






108. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., supra note 104; NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. 
COAL., supra note 104; Montgomery, supra note 104. This creates financial strain for the tenant and risk 
for the owner. While some landlords seek to avoid the financial risk, others accept tenants unable to pay 
the rent and then exploit that vulnerability, for example engaging in sexual harassment or refusing to 
conduct repairs. See DESMOND, supra note 11, at 75–76 (landlords who regularly rent to tenants with 
insufficient incomes operate under a business model of extracting profit from people perpetually behind in 
their rent, while using the threat of eviction for nonpayment as leverage for tenant concessions); Garboden 
& Rosen, supra note 11, at 640 (“The daily threat of eviction subjugates poor tenants, stripping them of 
their consumer rights.”) (emphasis in original). 
109. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of 
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 491–92 (2010). 
110. See Mary Spector, Tenant Stories: Obstacles and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 407, 414–15 (2007); Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A 
Statutory Proposal to Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1356–57 (2007). 
111. See ESME CARAMELLO & NORA MAHLBERG, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, 
COMBATING TENANT BLACKLISTING BASED ON HOUSING COURT RECORDS: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES 1–7 
(2017), https://perma.cc/PZX2-9HJE; Spector, supra note 110, at 416 (“Consumer reports used for the purpose 
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of determining eligibility for rental housing are widely used by landlords in connection with the selection of 
tenants and may contain information relating to the timeliness of the tenant’s rental history as well as the tenant’s 
prior involvement in eviction proceedings.”).  
112. 
Landlords also check credit as an indication of whether applicants will pay future 
rent.112
See Claire Tsosie, What Landlords Really Look for in a Credit Check, NERDWALLET (June 18, 
2019), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/finance/landlords-credit-check (“Because many landlords check 
applicants’ credit, your credit history could make a big difference in your next apartment search. The rise 
in online credit checks and increased competition in the rental market, meanwhile, have combined to put 
more pressure on potential tenants to make their applications shine.”). 
 Applications that require social security numbers exclude undocumented 
immigrants.113
See PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, THE RENTER’S GUIDE TO TENANT PRIVACY RIGHTS 2 
(2017), https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/renters-guide-tenant-privacy-rights.  
 Landlords also continue to engage in old-fashioned discrimination, 
refusing to rent to tenants on the basis of race, gender, or familial status.114 
See, e.g., Gene Demby, For People of Color, A Housing Market Partially Hidden from View, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO, CODE SWITCH (June 17, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/06/17/192730233/for-people-of-color-a-housing-market-
partially-hidden-from-view (study demonstrated people of color were shown fewer rental units, and asked 
to pay higher rents, compared to whites). 
For a tenant who can overcome these hurdles, financial barriers remain. The 
screening process typically requires an application fee, which is non-refundable 
regardless of the landlord’s decision.115 If a tenant is approved, in addition to costs 
of the actual move,116
See, e.g., BRETT THEODOS, SARA MCTARNAGHAN & CLAUDIA COULTON, URBAN INST., 
FAMILY RESIDENTIAL INSTABILITY: WHAT CAN STATES AND LOCALITIES DO? 8 (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98286/family_residential_instability_what_can_stat
es_and_localities_do_1.pdf (“Relocation costs can consume considerable financial reserves, including 
costs related to searching for housing, deposits, security fees, and moving. Families on tight budgets can 
go into debt or be unable to meet basic needs because of the financial burden of moving.”). 
 obtaining the keys may require advance payment of the first 
month’s rent, the last month’s rents,117 and a security deposit that may be equal to 
another month’s rent or double that.118
See DiDi Delgado, Just as I Suspected, Paying Rent is Racist, SHELTERFORCE (July 26, 2017), 
https://shelterforce.org/2017/07/26/just-as-i-suspected-paying-rent-is-racist (“Sometimes first, last, and 
security are the only things stopping people from finding a safe place to live.”). 
 This total far exceeds the monthly income 
of a poor tenant.119
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, at 4 
(2019), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2019.pdf 
(“The share of US households paying more than 30 percent of their incomes for housing [is] the standard 
definition of cost burdens. . . . 47.4 percent of renter households remained cost burdened. . . . Households 
with incomes under $15,000 continue to have the highest burden rates, with 83 percent paying more than 
30 percent of income for housing, including 72 percent paying more than 50 percent.”). 
 Moreover, the tenant cannot use the security deposit from the 
current, substandard residence. Most states permit landlords to keep security 
deposits for thirty days or more after a tenant has vacated a unit,120
See How Long Does the Landlord Have to Return a Security Deposit?, LEGALNATURE, 
https://help.legalnature.com/41902-faqs/223937-how-long-does-the-landlord-have-to-return-a-security-
deposit (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (summarizing state law regarding maximum time for withholding 
deposits). 
 and some 
landlords never return them.121  
113. 
114. 
115. See, e.g., Robert Friedman, How to Survive Legally as a Landlord, 83 AM. JUR. Trials § 4 (2019) 
(advising landlords to “charge a non-refundable application fee to cover the costs of credit reports and/or 
tenant eviction check services”).  
116 . 




121. See Jennifer White Karp, New NYC Rent Laws Require Security Deposits to be Returned in 14 Days 
and Landlords are Fuming, BRICK UNDERGROUND, (Aug. 23, 2019),  
No. 1] (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights 111 
 
                                                                                                                         
https://www.brickunderground.com/rent/new-rent-laws-require-security-deposit-return-14-days-landlords-NYC 
(“Landlords took their sweet time. And there was massive abuse. I can’t tell you how many calls and inquiries I 
have received over the years on this issue where landlords didn’t return security deposits and had no legal basis 
to refuse to do so.”) (quoting Sam Himmelstein, an attorney who represents tenants and tenant associations). 
122. See Desmond et al., supra note 42, at 228, 254  (collecting literature). 
123 . 
While these impediments to moving are significant, focusing on them elides 
an important consideration: what if a tenant has reasons to stay? Maintaining a 
stable residence nets social and economic benefits for children and adults. 122 
Moving can require relocating to a neighborhood farther from social support 
networks, childcare, schools, employment, and other resources.123  
See Emily Badger, Why Don’t People Who Can’t Afford Housing Just Move Where It’s 
Cheaper?, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/upshot/why-dont-people-
who-cant-afford-housing-just-move-where-its-cheaper.html. 
Even if the tenant were willing to move, why would tenant relocation be the 
appropriate solution to the problem of substandard housing? As recent eviction 
research demonstrates, uprooting families and undercutting social ties impedes 
economic mobility and creates broader damage to communities.124 Moreover, the 
law does not place the burden of alleviating substandard housing on the tenant. As 
the next subpart will show, the law requires the owner to bear responsibility. 
B. The Right to Safe Housing 
Substandard housing conditions have been prohibited for years.125 The sources 
of law protecting tenants’ right to safe housing are multiple and overlapping. They 
authorize both private rights of action for tenants and government enforcement.126  
This subpart will identify the relevant doctrine. It will then discuss how the right 
to safe housing relates to the absence of a broader right to housing. Finally, it will 
address potential concerns about the consequences of enforcement.  
1. Rights and Remedies 
Current doctrine recognizes more than four sets of claims regarding 
substandard housing and three sets of actors who could enforce the laws. 
Depending on the facts, a tenant might allege claims from any of the following 
categories: the implied warranty of habitability; common law torts; consumer 
protection statutes; or antidiscrimination laws. In addition to tenants’ private rights 
of action, there is statutory authority for public agencies at all levels of government 
to pursue at least some of these cases. This subpart will very briefly explain the 
124. See Desmond & Bell, supra note 15, at 25–26 (collecting literature); Desmond, supra note 42, 
at 89 (“Increased residential mobility is associated with a host of negative outcomes, including higher rates 
of adolescent violence, poor school performance, health risks, psychological costs, and the loss of 
neighborhood ties.”) (internal citations omitted). Notably, when a tenant vacates, the underlying problem 
of substandard conditions remains unresolved and passes along to the next set of occupants.  
125. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 121–26. 
126. This Article focuses on claims available in private, unsubsidized housing, but it is worth noting 
that federal laws and regulations supplement these claims with additional requirements in subsidized 
housing and public housing. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2015) (describing housing quality standards 
and inspection of federally subsidized housing); see also Franzese et al., supra note 19, at 24, 27–28 
(illustrating that government actors’ withholding of subsidies from private landlords who violate housing 
standards was a strong incentive for landlords to address the problems). 
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role of local housing codes and enforcement agencies, then describe tenants’ 
private rights of action, and, finally, suggest that state and federal government 
offices can play a role. 
Local housing codes regulate the design, construction, and maintenance of 
buildings, and local agencies are charged with enforcing the codes.127
See Rosser, supra note 16, at 34–36; CHANGELAB SOLUTIONS, UP TO CODE: CODE ENFORCEMENT 
STRATEGIES FOR HEALTHY HOUSING 5 (2015), http://www.changelabsolutions.org/sites/default/files/Up-tp-
Code_Enforcement_Guide_FINAL-20150527.pdf.  
 The specifics 
of the codes and enforcement processes vary by jurisdiction, 128  but most 
enforcement is conducted through the following administrative process. 129  A 
tenant makes a complaint to the agency; a housing code enforcement officer 
inspects; a notice of violation is issued to the owner; the owner is given a defined 
time period within which to correct the conditions; and if the owner fails to do so, 
the agency initiates an administrative proceeding, which may result in fines, an 
order to correct, and, potentially, a loss of a license or a lien on the property.130 In 
particularly severe cases, a locality may seize possession of the property or 
demolish it. 131 In addition to these administrative processes, the housing code 
agency may pursue a civil enforcement action. 132  If pursued zealously, civil 
enforcement can result in an injunction to repair the property, civil penalties, and, 
if an owner fails to comply with the injunctive order, civil contempt.133 
Tenants may enforce housing standards on their own. The most basic source 
of modern law for tenants’ private right of action is the implied warranty of 
habitability.134 Just as sales of goods include implied warranties, so too do leases 
of property.135 A residential lease includes an implied warranty that the housing is 
fit for human habitation. 136  Although the implied warranty of habitability 
developed through common law,137 it is now codified in the laws of every state 
except one. 138  
See Benjamin Hardy, No Vote on Landlord-Tenant Bill After Realtor Association Declares 
Opposition, ARK. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2019), https://arktimes.com/arkansas-blog/2019/03/07/no-vote-on-
landlord-tenant-bill-after-realtor-association-declares-opposition (explaining that every state except 
Arkansas has codified the implied warranty of habitability).  
State statutes delineate landlords’ specific obligations of 
                                                                                                                         
127. 
128. See Rosser, supra note 16, at 36. 
129. See CHANGELAB SOLUTIONS, supra note 127, at 19–20. 
130. Id. 
131. See Richard E. Carlton, Richard Landfield & James B. Loken, Note, Enforcement of Municipal 
Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 831–34 (1965) (discussing municipal power to demolish buildings 
and require that tenants vacate). 
132. See CHANGELAB SOLUTIONS, supra note 127, at 19. 
133. Id. Some cities criminalize the willful failure to maintain property, id. at 20, but this Article 
focuses on civil enforcement. 
134. See Lonegrass, supra note 13, 419–25 (describing common law development of warranty of 
habitability). The predecessor of the warranty of habitability was the “covenant of quiet enjoyment,” which 
required a landlord not to disturb the tenant through improper eviction, partial eviction, or constructive 
eviction resulting from intolerable property conditions. See Campbell, supra note 98, at 797–99 (describing 
how expansion of the covenant of quiet enjoyment ultimately led to recognition of the implied warranty of 
habitability). The implied warranty of habitability provides tenants with more protections than the covenant 
of quiet enjoyment because, under the warranty of habitability, the tenant does not need to be forced out of 
the home to assert a claim. Cf. id. at 799–800. The covenant of quiet enjoyment continues to operate but 
has lost importance following recognition of the implied warranty of habitability. 
135. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074–77 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
136. Id. at 1077. 
137. See id. at 1077–82. 
138. 
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maintenance and repair, with most requiring landlords to “make all repairs and do 
what is necessary to maintain the property in fit and habitable condition;” supply 
running water, hot water, and heat; “maintain systems in good and safe working 
order”; and control the presence of insects, vermin, and dangerous substances 
including lead, asbestos, and mold.139  
Although the breach of the implied warranty of habitability first received 
recognition and is most frequently contemplated as a defense in a nonpayment 
action,140 a tenant may also bring the claim in an affirmative suit initiated by the 
tenant against the landlord.141 The breach of the warranty may be interpreted to bar 
the landlord’s right to collect rent based on the view that the landlord’s obligation 
to maintain the premises and the tenant’s obligation to pay rent are mutually 
dependent.142 The value of the defective premises may be deemed less than that of 
the premises as warranted, and thus the rent owed will be less than the amount 
listed in the contract.143 Remedies for the tenant who establishes a breach of the 
warranty may include a rent abatement,144 the option to conduct repairs and deduct 
the cost from the rent,145 or specific performance in the form of correcting the 
conditions.146  
Substandard conditions that result in harm to a tenant or occupant147 may also 
give rise to claims under the common law of torts. 148  Claims may include 
negligence, breach of the duty to warn, and negligent or even intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.149 Establishing the elements of a tort claim can be more 
complex than proving a violation of the warranty of habitability, but tort law opens 
up the possibility of significant categories of damages to compensate for a family’s 
harm.150  
                                                                                                                         
139. See Benfer & Gold, supra note 17, at S26 (describing states’ adoption of the Uniform Residential 
Landlord Tenant Act and its revisions). 
140. See Javins 428 F.2d at 1071–82 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (setting precedent in recognizing the implied 
warranty of habitability); Franzese et al., supra note 19, at 5; Summers, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
141. A tenant may also raise the breach as a counterclaim in an eviction action. See Sabbeth, supra 
note 41, at 112–14 (discussing counterclaims in summary ejectments). 
142. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082–83. 
143. See infra Part III.A.2.i (describing calculation of rent abatement). 
144. See Summers, supra note 19, at 5–6 (describing empirical study of rent abatements); Franzese 
et al., supra note 19, at 8–9 (listing available remedies). 
145. See Campbell, supra note 98, at 808–09 (arguing that the “repair-and-deduct” remedy recognized 
under modern doctrine exceeds traditional contract law damages). 
146. Id. at 823 (comparing common law and statutory rights). 
147. While the tenant has rights and obligations as a party to the lease agreement, other occupants, 
such as the children of the tenant, may possess a different set of rights and obligations. For example, the 
children cannot claim a breach of the warranty of habitability, but they do receive protections from tort 
law. The above discussion focuses primarily on the claims of tenants. 
148. See Lonegrass, supra note 13, at 414–15 (explaining why such cases may be interpreted under 
tort law); see also CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 76, at 138–39 (describing tort litigation regarding 
lead paint in homes). 
149. See Lonegrass, supra note 13, at 425–26 (listing relevant tort claims); see also DAN B. DOBBS 
ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 124 (2d ed. 2019) (defining elements of negligence); 276 (defining duty to 
warn), 384 (“Emotional distress is a primary element of recovery in many torts, and many causes of action 
can be recast as claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.”). 
150. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing tort damages). 
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Consumer protection laws offer additional causes of action. Conduct violating 
the warranty of habitability might violate state151 statutes prohibiting unfair debt 
collection or unfair and deceptive trade practices. 152  In North Carolina, for 
example, demanding rent for residential property with knowledge that the property 
is uninhabitable has been recognized as a violation of the state’s prohibition on 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”153 A significant 
feature that distinguishes consumer protection legislation from the law of torts, 
contracts, and habitability legislation is that consumer protection statutes provide 
additional remedies. A tenant who prevails on a consumer claim may be entitled 
to liquidated damages that triple the award,154 plus attorneys’ fees.155 
If a landlord discriminates on the basis of race or another protected 
characteristic when assigning a tenant to a substandard property or failing to 
maintain a property, such conduct will also violate antidiscrimination laws. The 
federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) “makes it unlawful to discriminate against any 
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of . . . rental of a dwelling, or in the 
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, [] national origin . . . or handicap.”156 It also forbids 
representing to a potential renter, on the basis of a protected characteristic of the 
renter, that a unit is not available when the unit is in fact available.157 Federal 
regulations specify that the FHA prohibits discrimination in “[f]ailing [to perform] 
or delaying maintenance or repairs,”158 or in “[a]ssigning any person to a particular 
section of a community, neighborhood or development, or to a particular floor of 
a building . . . .”159 In addition to violating the FHA, discrimination of this kind 
against non-white tenants could also potentially give rise to Section 1981 claims 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1886, which guarantees all persons in the United 
States the “same right to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.”160 
Intentionally steering tenants of color to substandard apartments and failing to 
provide them with maintenance services is not uncommon, 161  but 
                                                                                                                         
151. Federal consumer protection statutes may also be implicated, see Commonwealth v. Monumental 
Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 483–86 (1974) (citing cases), but the doctrine is woefully underdeveloped. See 
infra Part IV.A (describing “underenforcement snowballing” and “underdevelopment” of law). 
152. See Eric Sirota, The Rental Crisis Will Not be Televised: A Call for Greater Parity Between 
Tenants and Traditional Consumers 4–5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing 
consumer claims). 
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2018); see Allen v. Simmons, 394 S.E.2d 478, 483–84 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1990); Creekside Apartments v. Poteat, 446 S.E.2d 826, 833-34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994), discretionary 
review denied, 451 S.E.2d 632 (1994). 
154. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2018). 
155. See, e.g., § 75-16.1. Fee-shifting statutes require defendants in special categories of cases to pay 
prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing fee-shifting statutes). 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f) (2012) State and local laws supplement the federal FHA and expand the 
list of protected classes. See, e.g., Miller v. 270 Empire Realty LLC, No. 09-CV-2957 (RJD) (RER), 2012 
WL 1933798, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2012) (ruling that tenant’s sexual orientation discrimination claim 
survived summary judgment under state and local law).  
157. § 3604(d).  
158. 20 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2) (2016).  
159. 24 C.F.R. §100.70(c)(4) (2013). 
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012). 
161. See, e.g., 273 Lee Ave. Tenants Ass’n v. Steinmetz, 330 F. Supp. 3d 778, 782–86, 793, 795–96 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding “evidence . . . that Defendants’ challenged actions [of denying Latinxs heat and 
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antidiscrimination laws can also be used to challenge less obvious misconduct. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that housing policies with a discriminatory 
impact can violate the FHA without proof of discriminatory intent.162 For example, 
if a landlord adopts a repair or assignment policy that has a disparate impact on 
tenants of a particular race, this may constitute race discrimination.  
Additionally, the FHA requires landlords to make “reasonable 
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such 
accommodations may be necessary to afford [disabled tenants] equal opportunity 
to use and enjoy a dwelling.”163 For example, if a member of a tenant’s family 
suffers from asthma, a landlord might be required to remediate mold more quickly 
than otherwise or might be required to immediately transfer the family to a mold-
free unit.164 
Antidiscrimination laws offer a powerful source of rights for many tenants in 
substandard homes. Like consumer protection statutes, antidiscrimination laws 
include provisions for shifting the burden of attorneys’ fees to the landlord if the 
tenant prevails.165 These statutes are not available in every case, but they could 
potentially apply with some frequency.  
While tenants possess private rights of action under antidiscrimination and 
consumer protection laws, they are not the only actors with the authority to pursue 
these claims. At the same time that local agencies carry responsibility for enforcing 
local housing codes, state and federal agencies enjoy the power to enforce 
consumer protection and civil rights statutes. Some offices of states’ attorneys 
general include divisions dedicated specifically to civil rights or consumer 
protection. On the federal level, the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Department 
of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and Consumer Financial Protection 
                                                                                                                         
repairs while providing such services to Hasidic Jews] were motivated by discrimination”); United States 
v. Cochran, 39 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (finding evidence of “a systematic practice or policy 
to deprive black Americans’ rights guaranteed under the Fair Housing Act on the basis of their race,” 
including refusal to conduct maintenance and use of racial slurs in response to repair requests); see also 
Jimenez v. Tsai, No. 5:16-cv-04434-EJD, 2017 WL 2423186, at *5–7 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2017) (denying 
motion to dismiss race and national origin discrimination claims, where plaintiffs alleged landlord 
maintained units occupied by white and Asian tenants but units of Mexican-born tenants were “rife with 
dangerous, unsanitary, and uninhabitable conditions”); Khodeir v. Sayyed, 15 Civ. 8763 (DAB), 2016 WL 
5817003, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (denying landlord’s motion to dismiss, where tenants alleged 
landlord failed to provide services due to familial status and “anti-Arab bias”). More research is needed on 
discrimination in assignment and maintenance of units. During this author’s practice of representing tenants 
in substandard housing, race and national origin discrimination has been a recurrent theme. The author’s 
clinic students have handled multiple cases on behalf of Black and Latinx families assigned first-floor or 
basement units with substandard conditions that were not present on higher floors, which were reserved 
for whites. 
162. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2521–52 (2015). 
163. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (describing 
protections in federally subsidized housing); Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 
1201, et seq. 
164. Disabilities of family members and other residents, not only those of named tenants, must be 
accommodated. See § 3604 (f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination because of a disability of the “renter, [] a 
person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so . . . rented, . . . or any person associated 
with that . . . renter”). 
165. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(c)(2), 12205 (2012). 
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Bureau operate to safeguard the public in precisely these areas. As Part IV will 
argue, state and federal agencies could do more of this work. 
2. A Right to Housing? 
The doctrine governing housing safety includes private rights of action for 
tenants, as explained above. This is important to emphasize because poor people’s 
interests are often viewed as needs, which can be addressed voluntarily in the spirit 
of charity, rather than as rights that can be demanded. 166  Moreover, housing 
conditions law is one of the few areas of legal doctrine in the United States that 
protects the interests of poor people in particular.167 Poor people possess limited 
procedural rights, and their substantive, positive rights are even more scarce.168 
Although a universal right to housing remains aspirational,169 the guarantee of safe 
housing is well-settled. This subpart briefly explains how these two legal principles 
interrelate.  
Environmental and health justice scholars have pushed for an expanded 
understanding of housing rights, drawing on federal civil rights statutes. 170 
Advocates have also highlighted that housing is an established human right under 
international law.171 This author is deeply sympathetic to those arguments, but one 
need not accept them to accept the right to safe housing. 
To be clear, the specific subject of this Article—the right to safe housing—is 
not debated. Commentators might take a normative position that housing standards 
should not be enforced,172 but no one questions whether, as a descriptive matter, 
these standards exist in the law on the books. Regardless of the position one takes 
on the broader concept of housing as a right, the status of the right to safe housing 
in current doctrine is not questioned.  
One might argue that a negative prohibition on substandard housing is 
different from an affirmative right to housing that meets set standards. If there is 
no guarantee of shelter, how can there be a guarantee that shelter meets any 
standards? The answer is that, as in many areas of the law, different statuses confer 
                                                                                                                         
166. See Weissman, supra note 45, at 785–817. 
167. See HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, GETTING BY: ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND LEGAL 
PROTECTIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH LOW INCOME passim (forthcoming 2019) (summarizing legal rights that 
protect people with low incomes, highlighting few that benefit poor people in particular, and noting that 
rights specific to poor people tend to be procedural). The closest analogy, with respect to laws that protect 
poor people in particular, may be labor laws that mandate a minimum wage and prohibit child labor.  
168. See JULIET M. BRODIE, ET AL., POVERTY LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 116 (2014) (“In general, 
poor people’s claims to procedural rights have fared better than their claims to substantive rights.”); see 
also Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2201 
(2013) (“[P]rocedural rights may be especially prone to legitimate the status quo, because ‘fair’ process 
masks unjust substantive outcomes and makes those outcomes seem more legitimate.”). 
169. See Chester Hartman, The Case for a Right to Housing, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING, supra note 91, 
at 177 (“Although establishing a right to housing in the United States does not appear to be immediately 
feasible, that political reality in no way detracts from the argument that our society ought to embrace it.”); 
MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 195–200 (envisioning a “radical right to housing” that 
“necessarily implies fundamental challenges to the existing system” but “should not, strictly speaking, be 
seen as utopian”).  
170. See Harris & Pamukcu, supra note 18, at 42–44, 48–49 (collecting literature). 
171. See, e.g., Risa Kaufman et al., The Interdependence of Rights:Protecting the Human Right to 
Housing by Promoting the Right to Counsel, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 772, 777–83 (2014).  
172. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing and rejecting arguments against enforcement). 
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different bundles of rights. Tenants of residential property are entitled to habitable 
homes.173 As mentioned above, when property owners fail to provide habitable 
conditions, the law recognizes causes of action for tenants.  
Despite the above collection of legal protections, poor people’s right to safe 
housing remains underenforced. The causes and consequences of this 
underenforcement will be discussed in the remainder of this Article. Before 
delving further, however, the section below will anticipate and respond to a 
potential concern that enforcement might be counterproductive.  
3. Enforcement as Socially Desirable  
This Article takes as established that enforcement of the laws governing 
housing safety is socially desirable. 174 In the 1970s, a lively academic debate 
emerged as to whether enforcement of housing safety standards would cause poor 
tenants to be priced out of housing.175 Without a substandard market, the argument 
went, poor people might have no housing at all. 176  Of course today rent is 
impossibly high and massive numbers of people are homeless, so the rampant 
underenforcement of housing standards appears not to mitigate the homelessness 
crisis.177 
See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Nobody Knows What to Do About L.A.’s Homelessness Crisis, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 26, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/ls-growing-
homelessness-crisis-isnt-2020-issue/592624 (describing national “homelessness crisis” and rising housing 
costs). 
Yet, theoretically, the problem could be still worse if standards were 
enforced. So far, however, empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis.178  
More fundamentally, even if it were true that enforcement puts upward 
pressure on market rates for rent, the market is a creation of regulation, and that 
regulation is subject to revision. The U.S. housing market has been regulated in 
varying ways since the nation’s birth.179 The inextricability of housing markets and 
regulation is not only an historical fact but also a basic truth of housing in a social 
context. David Madden and Peter Marcuse explain: 
                                                                                                                         
173. See David B. Bryson, The Role of Courts and a Right to Housing, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING 193, 
supra note 91, at 197 (“[The warranty of habitability] does not go further and oblige the government to 
warrant that everyone will have habitable housing. . . . [The] right to habitable housing . . . does nothing . 
. .  for people who are so poor that they cannot get a landlord to rent to them.”). 
174. This Article focuses on rental housing occupied by tenants. Although beyond the scope of this 
piece, there are good arguments that owners who occupy their residences and cannot afford to repair them 
should not be required to do so. See Uzdavines, supra note 97, at 173–76 (describing enforcement against 
poor owner-occupants); Rosser, supra note 16, at 53–4 (describing code enforcement regarding 
construction of rural, owner-occupied units). Additionally, while destruction of “blighted” neighborhoods 
that results in the uprooting of poor communities is deeply problematic, the source of that problem is not 
an excess of enforcement so much as government intrusion untethered from the goals of the community. 
See infra Part III.B.2. For theoretical models that aim to evaluate when underenforcement is problematic 
and when it is productive, see Justin LaMort, The Rich Get Richer and the Public Gets Punished: How 
Unenforced Regulations Perpetuate Inequality, 4 LOYOLA U. CHI. J. REG. COMPLIANCE 101, 104 
(forthcoming 2019) and Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1752. 
175. See Desmond & Bell, supra note 15, at 21–22 (summarizing literature). 
176. See id. 
177. 
178. See Desmond & Bell, supra note 15, at 76 (summarizing literature under the heading “An 
Argument Without Evidence: Does Housing Code Enforcement Help or Harm the Poor?”).  
179. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 121 (noting housing regulation in the United States 
dates back to colonial Williamsburg, Philadelphia, and Savannah).  
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[W]hile markets are imagined as self-organizing entities . . . the 
state has always been central to the process of making housing a 
commodity that can circulate through market exchange. The state 
cannot “get out” of housing markets because the state is one of the 
institutions that creates them. Government sets the rules of the 
game. It enforces the sanctity of contracts, establishes and defends 
regimes of property rights, and plays a central role in connecting 
the financial system to the bricks and mortar in which people 
dwell. In other words, housing markets are political all the way 
down. . . . The housing market is, among other things, a domain 
of struggle between different, unequal groups. Removing the 
regulations that rein in property owners shifts power towards 
capital and away from residents. . . . This is why it is the real estate 
that lobby campaigns to deregulate the housing system, a demand 
that tenants almost never make.180 
If policymakers are concerned that enforcement of housing standards could 
result in rising rents, they can use their legislative powers to prevent the rise. 
Legislators may choose from a variety of options: pass rent control laws that set 
maximum rent increases,181
See, e.g., Conor Dougherty & Luis Ferré-Sadurní, California Approves Statewide Rent Control to Ease 
Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/business/economy/california-
rent-control.html; Feargus O’Sullivan, Berlin Will Freeze Rents for Five Years, CITYLAB (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/06/berlin-rent-freeze-senate-vote-affordable-housing/592051;  
Sharon Otterman & Matthew Haag, Rent Regulations in New York: How They’ll Affect Tenants and Landlords, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/nyregion/rent-regulation-laws-new-york.html 
(explaining rent control and rent stabilization in New York State). 
 issue subsidies that cover increases (resulting from 
maintenance costs or more generally),182 or raise the minimum wage so tenants can 
cover increases themselves.183 Governments also have the option of influencing 
the price of housing by increasing the supply. An infusion of high-quality public 
housing would undercut a rent increase in the private market.184 Increasing the 
number of high-quality public housing units would also partially address the 
underlying social problem, by making available more safe and affordable 
housing.185 
                                                                                                                         
180. Id. at 46–47. Although commentators often point to “deregulation” trends, Madden and Marcuse 
remind us that “deregulation has not meant . . . getting rid of regulations so much as rewriting them to make 
real estate a more liquid commodity.” Id. at 131; see also id. at 34 (describing revisions to real estate 
investment trusts, encouraging the “financialization” of housing). 
181. 
182. J. Peter Byrne and Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The 
Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 534–35 (2007) (“If society insists on minimum standards, 
it cannot escape the necessity of providing subsidies to meet the costs of such housing.”). 
183. See Holder, supra note 103 (“Last year, the average worker making the federal wage minimum 
of $7.25 per hour had to work 122 hours a week, every single week, to afford an average two-bedroom 
apartment. Now, they have to work nearly 127—an almost-impossible feat that would require working 
about three full-time jobs.”). 
184. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 204–5.  
185. It must be acknowledged that public housing can also be severely substandard, see, e.g., BART M. 
SCHWARTZ, MONITOR’S FIRST QUARTERLY REPORTER FOR THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY 3–8 
(2019), https://newyork.cbslocal.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14578484/2019/07/NYCHA-federal-monitors-
first-quarterly-report.pdf (describing federal monitoring of New York City Housing Authority conditions 
including mold, rats, lead paint, and lack of heat or hot water), but history shows that local governments have 
succeeded in providing high-quality public housing under the right political circumstances. See ALEX. F. 
No. 1] (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights 119 
 
                                                                                                                         
SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 163 (3d ed. 2015) (“[Although] public housing evokes 
many, mostly negative images in the popular imagination . . . these images do not portray the reality of most 
public housing developments.”). The comparative advantages of publicly owned and managed housing versus 
public subsidies for private housing are beyond the scope of this Article, but it is important to recognize that—if 
high-quality affordable housing is a goal—any subsidies or tax benefits for private landlords must be 
accompanied by stringent housing standards and means of enforcing them. See Franzese et al., supra note 19, at 
24, 27 (arguing that government actors should withhold subsidies from landlords to incentivize repairs). 
186. See supra Part II.B.1. 
187 . See, e.g., ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 169–200 (2013); Scott L. Cummings & Ann Southworth, Between Profit and 
Principle: The Private Public Interest Firm, in PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING 
ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 183 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009); Louise 
Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social Justice and the Structures of Private Practice, in 
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 201 (Austin Sarat & 
Stuart Scheingold eds., 1996). Although law firms also provide volunteer-based “pro bono” services, this Article 
directs attention to market-based work, given the fundamental limits of pro bono. See Scott L. Cummings, The 
Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 116–23 (2004). 
188. See Scott Cummings, Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3 (2012) 
(describing “the private public interest law firm, distinguished by a commitment to fuse profit and 
principle”) (italics omitted); Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 
2094–96 (2004) (describing mass tort lawyers who represent injured plaintiffs); Judith Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 78, 105–07, 111–12 (2011) (describing the market for private, for-profit lawyers who represent 
millions of clients in civil rights and consumer class actions); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private 
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1401–05 
(1998) (comparing public and private civil rights enforcement). 
189. See Cummings & Southworth, supra note 187, at 183, 196. 
190. See infra Part III.A.1. 
191. See infra Part III.A.2. 
192. See infra Part III.A.3. 
The argument that enforcement of tenants’ right to safe housing will result in 
pricing tenants out of housing misses the forest for the trees. It rests on the 
assumption that it is better to have dangerous housing than no housing. Yet the “no 
housing” outcome is not predetermined. The enforcement of housing standards 
does not necessarily cause the affordable housing stock to shrink. Moreover, to the 
extent that policymakers want housing to remain available for poor people, they 
have the power to ensure that it does. 
III. THE ENFORCEMENT GAP  
The right to safe housing is an established right for poor tenants.186 Yet neither 
the private legal market nor the public sector enforces it. The reason is that the 
affected tenants are poor. 
A. Market-Based Enforcement 
As with other goods and services, market-based mechanisms supply parties 
with lawyers. While not as well-known as their non-profit counterparts, market-
based lawyers, too, engage in public interest litigation.187 Indeed, many of the 
attorneys who enforce civil rights statutes and consumer protections work at 
private, for-profit firms.188 They rely on a combination of payment approaches,189 
including traditional client billing, 190  contingency fees, 191  and fee-shifting. 192 
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While not without flaws, the private market has brought significant resources and 
success to the enforcement of public rights.193 
Although the private market addresses some areas of public rights, it rarely 
supports representation of poor tenants seeking to vindicate their right to safe housing. 
Poor tenants cannot pay lawyers to represent them at current market rates. Neither can 
they rely on alternative market mechanisms to attract lawyers, because the law 
underestimates the value of their cases and the work involved in representing them.  
1. The Poor Can’t Pay 
The traditional rule in the United States is that each party in civil litigation 
pays its own costs, including those of retaining counsel.194 Even some civil rights 
plaintiffs pay their counsel hourly rates plus upfront retainer fees.195 Poor tenants 
cannot afford to retain counsel at market rates.196 
See Michael Zuckerman, Is There Such Thing as an Affordable Lawyer?, THE ATLANTIC (May 30, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/is-there-such-a-thing-as-an-affordable-lawyer/371746 
(describing tenants who faced substandard housing conditions but could not afford a lawyer); David C. Vladeck, 
In re Arons: The Plight of the “Unrich” in Obtaining Legal Services, in LEGAL ETHICS STORIES 255, 261, 
284–86 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban eds., 2006) (highlighting middle-class families’ difficulty 
securing counsel). Sliding scales offered by “low-bono” lawyers have not generally been used for housing 
conditions cases, presumably because of the significant time investment they require. Cf. Luz E. Herrera, 
Encouraging the Development of “Low Bono” Law Practices, 14 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION, GENDER 
& CLASS 1, 9–11 (2014) (describing low-bono alternative for routine, simple matters). 
While cost is not the only factor 
that discourages them from seeking counsel, it can be independently prohibitive.197 
Compounding the problem, while tenants in substandard housing generally cannot 
purchase representation to enforce the laws that prohibit it, individuals who could 
afford to hire lawyers typically avoid such conditions.198 As a result, the pay-to-
play structure systematically neglects the enforcement of housing safety laws.  
2. Class, Race, and Gender Biases Devalue Contingency Fees 
The contingency fee is a common market mechanism for enforcement when 
victims are unable to pay lawyers upfront.199 The lawyer collects the contingency 
fee only if successful, and it typically comes out of the client’s winnings as one-
                                                                                                                         
193. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to Do With It? Public Interest Lawyering and Profit, 
91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 482–87 (2014). 
194. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and 
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2130–37 
(2000) (highlighting “unaided access” as a premise of the U.S. civil justice system). This is one of the 
major differences between civil and criminal justice, because criminal defendants facing incarceration are 
provided counsel at the expense of the state. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Sabbeth, The Prioritization of Criminal 
over Civil Counsel and the Discounted Danger of Private Power. 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 889, 895 (2015).  
195. See, e.g., Amy Myrick, Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Racial Disparities in Legal 
Representation for Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 107, 118–19 (2016). 
196. 
197. See Rebecca Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 339, 352 (2008); Myrick, Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 195, at 115 (“Searching for a lawyer is 
a complicated and time-consuming process” that requires “social and material resources.”). 
198. See supra Part II.A.2. 
199. See HERBERT KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS 9 (2004) (defining contingency 
fees). 
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third of the monetary award.200 Contingency arrangements supply lawyers in cases 
that have a reasonable probability of success and damages high enough to make 
the pursuit worthwhile when factoring in the time and expenses of the litigation.201 
The obstacle for housing safety enforcement is that it is not a good financial 
investment. 
Obtaining and enforcing a judicial order to conduct repairs requires time and 
tenacity. Landlords regularly obfuscate and delay, often with judicial support.202 
Getting the court to hold a hearing may require numerous appearances, and once 
successful in obtaining an order, the lawyer may need to engage in significant 
motion practice before the owner complies.203 
The contingency fee provides little compensation for this work. Lawyers 
consider the likely time investment when setting the fee, but the fee structure is 
generally independent of hours actually expended. Contingency fees turn on 
monetary damages. This dependence on monetary damages creates a fundamental 
problem for contingency fees as a means for enforcement of poor tenants’ rights.204 
Although people living in substandard conditions experience significant harm, 
the legal system fails to translate that harm into monetary relief. 205  As the 
following sections will explain, courts calculate damages using methods that fail 
to measure accurately the injuries that poor people suffer. Specifically, the law of 
torts and contracts incorporates biases of class, race, and gender that depress poor 
tenants’ awards. In this sense, the law both undervalues and devalues poor people’s 
claims. 
a. Rent Abatements Are Proportional to Class and Undervalue 
Home as a Place to Live  
The most common monetary remedy for a violation of the warranty of 
habitability is a rent abatement. 206  This is a retroactive or prospective rent 
reduction for any period when the premises are substandard.207 Abatements are 
                                                                                                                         
200. See id. at 9–10, 44.  
201. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 
DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 270–71 (1998). 
202. See Summers, supra note 19, at 50 (documenting repeated court appearances by which time 
conditions had not been remedied); Cotton, supra note 19, at 68–71 (explaining that substandard conditions 
“failed to inspire a sense of urgency” for judges). 
203. Cf. Summers, supra note 19, at 50 (showing that landlords failed to conduct repairs, in violation 
of court-ordered settlements, in almost seventy-five percent of the cases for which data was available). 
204. Technically, a contingency fee agreement is any in which the fee depends on the result, but the 
common conception is one in which the fee comes out of the client’s monetary award. See KRITZER, supra 
note 199. 
205. Personal injury cases with severe injuries and clear documentary evidence of specific causation 
can result in larger damage awards. In substandard housing conditions cases, these are the rare exception 
and do not provide a solution to the common underenforcement of tenants’ rights. 
206. See, e.g., Summers supra note 19, at 19–22 (summarizing literature); 5 THOMPSON ON REAL 
PROPERTY § 41.06(a)(6)(iii) (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2015) (“If it is determined that the landlord has 
breached the implied warranty of habitability, the result will be a judicially approved reduction, or 
abatement, of the tenant’s rental obligation. In most situations, this will probably be the most important 
remedial option available to a tenant.”). 
207. See, e.g., ANDREW SCHERER & HON. FERN FISCHER, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW 
IN N.Y. § 12:104  (2018) (“Lack of heat and hot water is probably the archetypical violation of the warranty 
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typically calculated based on the difference between the fair market value of the 
premises as warranted and the fair market value of the premises in their 
substandard condition.208  
The rent abatement method for calculating damages reduces the likelihood of 
a poor tenant possessing a claim with a high dollar value, because it produces 
awards that are roughly proportional to class status. People generally live in the 
most desirable space they can afford, and poor people generally live in homes with 
relatively low rents compared to people who can afford more. Because the rent 
abatement calculation is derivative of the tenant’s monthly rent, it incorporates 
class as a factor in the award. 
The rent abatement method, as currently calculated, is particularly ill-suited to 
address severely substandard conditions. The absence of a functioning bathroom 
or safe sleeping quarters dramatically decreases the utility of a residence, and 
dangers posed by mold, lead paint, or fire hazards might bring that utility down to 
a negative figure, as no one would willingly expose their children and themselves 
to such risks.209 Yet courts are extremely reluctant to find a fair market value of 
zero, let alone a negative number. They conclude that tenants benefitted from the 
living arrangement or would not have chosen to remain. Even in the most serious 
situations, courts discount the rent by less than half.210Their judgments fail to 
acknowledge that staying does not indicate a lack of suffering, only the absence of 
alternatives.211 
In this way, analyzing housing as a contracted-for commodity fails to capture 
the reality of housing as a place to live.212 A safe and secure home may actually be 
more important for a poor tenant than a wealthier one, given the difference in their 
ability to find a replacement, but the current approach of assessing contract 
damages seems to assume the reverse.  
Remedies for a breach of the warranty of habitability can include 
consequential damages, such as compensation for damaged possessions. Judges 
ruling on housing conditions cases, however, often decide that significant damages 
                                                                                                                         
of habitability, and can, if properly proven, result in abatements of 50% of the rent or more for periods that 
they are not provided.”). 
208. See Lonegrass, supra note 13, at 431. 
209. See id. (“[A] tenant rents a dwelling for shelter, not profit, and [the] tenant’s losses, in discomfort 
and worry over dangers, are intangible.”) (quoting MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 10.101 
(4th ed. 1997)). 
210. See Franzese et al., supra note 19, at 24 (describing 50% abatement as best case scenario, 
available only with good legal representation); Cotton, supra note 19, at 72 (“[M]onetary relief . . . was 
usually small, with the landlord generally receiving 75% of the lease rental amount or more.”); id. at 73 
(“Even where evidence actually indicated that the premises were unfit for human habitation, judges tended 
to think that the landlord still ought to get most of the rental amount set forth in the lease.”); id. at 74–75 
(describing hearing at which judge threatened landlord with ruling that landlord was not entitled to any 
rent, yet judge decided to award landlord 70% of the lease rent).  
211. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing why people stay). 
212. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 17–18 (“Commodification is the name for the 
general process by which the economic value of a thing comes to dominate its other uses. . . . Our economic 
system is predicated on the idea that there is no conflict between the economic-value form of housing and 
its lived form. But across the world, we see people who exploit dwelling space for profit coming into 
conflict with those who seek to use housing as their home.”). 
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beyond rent abatement are appropriate only for a case in tort.213 Yet poor tenants’ 
claims are devalued under tort law as well. 
b. Tort Damages Skew Low for Poor Tenants 
Under the common law of torts, both economic and non-economic damage 
calculations are proportional to class status. Economic damages skew low for poor 
people for at least three reasons. First, poor tenants’ possessions hold minimal 
market value. A common consequence of substandard housing conditions is the 
destruction of furniture, linens, clothing, toys, and other personal property, but, 
despite the personal disruption and difficulty of obtaining replacement items, if the 
items carry little market value, the economic damages will be minimal. Particularly 
for major items like furniture, poor people often make purchases in installments,214 
See, e.g., Amber Brooks, “Bad Credit” Furniture Financing: 14 Top Options, BADCREDIT.ORG 
(Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.badcredit.org/bad-credit-furniture-financing. 
which means they might not own the item and therefore will not be entitled to full 
reimbursement at the time of damage. Additionally, for possessions tenants do 
own, the market value of those possessions will have diminished between the time 
of purchase and the time of damage. The tenant will be entitled to recovery based 
on the market value of the used item, at the time of damage, regardless of what it 
would cost to obtain a replacement. 215  
See Brie Dyas, An Open Letter to Everyone Selling Furniture on Craigslist, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/open-letter-to-craigslist_b_2994760 (“You know how 
they say that a new car loses half its value when you drive it off the lot? It’s worse for furniture.”). 
Overall, when courts recognize that 
recovery for destroyed possessions is appropriate, the amount of recovery tends to 
be small. 
Second, major categories of economic damages are tied directly to social 
position. This is particularly clear with respect to lost wages and estimates of lost 
future income. The former comes into play when tenants miss work due to physical 
injuries or waiting for repair personnel. The lost wages of a low-income tenant will 
necessarily be lower than those of a person with a higher income. In other words, 
for the same amount of time, the market value of the loss when a low-income 
individual misses work is lower than that of a higher earner’s absence.216  
Estimates of lost future income capacity also incorporate biases of class, race, 
and gender. As discussed in Part II, substandard conditions can result in physical, 
psychological, and cognitive harms with long-term implications for reduced 
capabilities. In tort law, calculations for loss of future earning capacity depend on 
predictions of future annual income and the number of remaining years a person 
would have worked. Annual income predictions reflect prior earnings, educational 
background, and, for children with little history of their own, the earnings and 
                                                                                                                         
213. See Lonegrass, supra note 13, at 431–33 (critiquing courts’ rigid categorization of substandard 
housing claims as based in contracts or torts). 
214. 
215. 
216. Tenants who do not work in the formal economy face additional hurdles to establishing lost 
income and loss of future earning potential. See Gilman & Green, supra note 65, at 269. Some are 
unemployed or not fully employed due to a disability, childcare obligations, or the absence of jobs in the 
local economy. Others are excluded from formal employment opportunities because of immigration status 
or a criminal conviction. If tenants perform work in an informal economy, they may miss work as a result 
of their housing conditions, but they will be unable to demonstrate it, either because of a lack of 
documentation or because such documentation could expose them to liability.  
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education of their parents.217 Poor tenants’ class position therefore depresses their 
economic damage awards. 
For families headed by women of color, which families in substandard 
conditions disproportionately are, the award is further reduced by race-specific and 
gender-specific income predictions. For years, defense attorneys have presented 
evidence limiting earnings predictions based on the victims’ race or gender.218 
These calculations incorporate assumptions that, for instance, African Americans’ 
lives are shorter than whites’, women work fewer years than men, or disadvantaged 
groups receive reduced wages due to discrimination.219 In spite of critiques of such 
calculations,220 many courts still permit their use, resulting in depressed awards.221 
See Paul Bland, The Lives of Women and People of Color are Devalued in Our Civil Justice 
System. Let’s Change That., DAILY KOS (May 25, 2019), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2019/5/25/1860169/-The-Lives-of-Women-and-People-of-Color-are-
Devalued-in-Our-Civil-Justice-System-Let-s-Change-That?_=2019-05-25T10:57:33.956-07:00 
(describing advocacy in response to recent case in which damages for boy damaged by lead paint were 
limited by race-specific earnings predictions). 
The third and perhaps most fundamental reason that economic damages for 
poor tenants run low is that poor people do not possess excess funds to expend and 
later recoup. The law governing economic damages contemplates a victim who 
can alleviate her own suffering with fungible resources that can later be 
replenished, but this does not describe most victims of substandard conditions, who 
are poor. If most law professors were to find themselves facing dangerous 
conditions in a rental, they would quickly: move to a hotel or other temporary 
lodging; take meals in restaurants while without cooking facilities during the 
transition; and obtain medical care or consultations they deemed necessary to 
evaluate and treat their and their children’s mental and physical conditions. They 
would likely save receipts from purchases of food, transportation, living 
accommodations, medical services, and other expenditures. Yet a person without 
the cash or credit to cover these costs upfront might not make these purchases.222 
Poor people already struggling to make ends meet will often do everything they 
can to avoid financial expenditures, including foregoing moves and medical 
care.223  
See Corrine Lewis et al.,  Listening to Low-Income Patients: Obstacles to the Care We Need, When 
We Need It, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2017/listening-
low-income-patients-obstacles-care-we-need-when-we-need-it (describing financial and other reasons poor 
people forgo medical care). 
Poor tenants are unlikely to accumulate significant economic costs because 
they cannot bear the weight. The absence of economic costs does not mean that the 
residents did not suffer but that they were unable to purchase relief from their 
suffering. Poor people lack the extra financial resources that allow the hypothetical 
                                                                                                                         
217. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 76, at 158–60. 
218. Id. at 158–170. 
219. Id. 
220. Critics highlight that such calculations incorporate historical patterns of discrimination, discount 
the possibility of social progress, and potentially violate the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of 
the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 166. 
221. 
222. In this author’s experience representing clients, tenants in substandard housing have purchased 
allergy medication but avoided larger medical expenses to the extent possible. One tenant lived with severe 
mold that caused respiratory damage, but, even during a medical emergency, he refused to board an 
ambulance a friend had called on his behalf because he feared the bill that would follow.  
223. 
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tort victim to respond to the situation with an expenditure of funds. As a result, 
they cannot translate their suffering into economic damages.224   
c. Non-Economic Damages Compound Inequality 
The most serious harms of living day in and day out in substandard conditions 
may be non-economic: anxiety, depression, physical pain, and other forms of 
suffering.225 Bear in mind that economic or non-economic harms can result from 
either physical or emotional injuries. For example, while a burn from a fire could 
lead to economic damages like medical expenses or lost income, it could also or 
instead lead to non-economic damages like pain or suffering. For comparison, the 
emotional distress a parent might experience due to seeing her child in anguish is 
an emotional injury, which could lead to economic or non-economic categories of 
damages, or both.226 Despite the various ways the law attempts to acknowledge 
injuries and make victims whole, assessments of non-economic damages fail to 
capture the harms experienced by tenants living in substandard conditions.  
Calculations of non-economic damages underestimate harms by exacerbating 
biases of race, gender, and class. A growing literature has demonstrated that the 
pain of women, and specifically Black women, is routinely minimized.227 
See Camille Noe Pagán, When Doctors Downplay Women’s Health Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/well/live/when-doctors-downplay-womens-health-concerns.html; 
Vanessa Fabien, My Body, My Pain: Listen to Me and All Black Women, THE ROOT (April 16, 2017), 
https://www.theroot.com/my-body-my-pain-listen-to-me-and-all-black-women-1794332651; Kelly M. 
Hoffman, et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False Beliefs about 
Biological Differences between Blacks and Whites, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4296, 4296–97 (2016) 
(collecting literature). 
Even 
more troubling than the biases of jurors are those of medical professionals228 
entrusted to provide the expert testimony that shapes how courts interpret injuries 
and suffering.  
The calculation of non-economic damages incorporates further biases by 
repeating the problems of the economic damage assessments. An important 
phenomenon that has received little attention is the direct correlation between 
economic and non-economic damage amounts. Lawyers commonly evaluate non-
economic damages using a multiplier of economic damages.229 They assign to a 
                                                                                                                         
224. In addition to reducing the economic damage award, a tenant’s failure to mitigate harm can, in 
some jurisdictions, preclude claims altogether. Contributory negligence rules in some states will prevent 
plaintiffs from seeking compensation if they are found to have contributed to the problem. In a case of 
substandard conditions, the landlord may claim that, if the tenant stayed in dangerous conditions, they were 
contributorily negligent and not entitled to compensation. This rule disproportionately cuts off the claims 
of poor tenants, many of whom cannot relocate unless they accept homelessness. 
221. See supra Part II.A.1. 
226. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 76, at 172. 
227. 
228. See sources cited supra note 227. 
229. See, e.g., Mary E. Alexander & Robert E. Cartwright, Jr., 4 LITIGATING TORT CASES § 44:29 (2019) 
(describing the “multiplier” method); David Goguen, Two Ways to Calculate a Pain and Suffering Settlement, 
NOLO, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/two-ways-calculate-pain-suffering-settlement.html 
(“The most common approach is to add up all the special damages (remember, those are your more easily 
calculable economic losses) and multiply those by a number between 1.5 on the low end, and 4 or 5 on the high 
end.”); David Bressman, Pain and Suffering Calculator: How to Determine the Value of Your Claim’s 
Noneconomic Damages, BRESSMANLAW (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.bressmanlaw.com/blog/pain-and-
suffering-calculator-how-to-determine-the-value-of-your-claims-noneconomic-damages (“One of the most 
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popular ways of determining a fair settlement award for noneconomic damages is the multiplier method. This 
method multiplies your total number of economic damages by a number (multiplier), between 1.5 and five.”). In 
some states, damage caps limit the amount of permissible non-economic damages to a multiple of the economic 
damages. See, e.g., Greg Pogarsky & Linda Babcock, Damages Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining 
Impasse, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 143, 144 n. 2 (2001) (“The formula for deriving the cap amount also varies, with 
some states limiting damages to a specified dollar amount and others employing a ‘multiplier,’ which limits 
punitive or noneconomic damages to some multiple (usually two to four) of the compensatory damages 
awarded.”).   
230. See supra note 229.  
231. Although not as common as the “multiplier” method, another calculation approach is the “per 
diem” or “daily rate” method, which assigns a dollar value to each day of suffering and multiplies that 
amount by the number of days the person suffered. See Alexander & Cartwright, supra note 229 (describing 
the per diem method and noting it is not permitted in all jurisdictions); Goguen, supra note 229 (describing 
the daily rate approach as more difficult because “justifying the daily rate you use” is “slippery”); 
Bressman, supra note 229 (describing the per diem method). Unfortunately, depending how it is used, this 
method can incorporate the same biases as the multiplier method. Some attorneys use the person’s daily 
wage as the daily rate of suffering. See, e.g., Goguen, supra note 229 (“A good way to make sure your 
daily rate is ‘reasonable’ is to use your actual, daily earnings. The argument here is that having to deal with 
the pain caused by your injuries every day is at least comparable to the effort of going to work each day.”). 
This necessarily devalues the pain of people with low wages. 
232.  See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 17 (describing phenomenon of “commodification”); see 
also David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 1–2 
(2015) (noting neoliberalism’s “recurring claims” in “the ongoing contest between the imperatives of market 
economies and nonmarket values grounded in the requirements of democratic legitimacy”). 
233. See 78 AM. JUR. Trials § 559 (2019) (“The medical record is essential in assessing and proving 
damages and in showing pain and suffering. . . .”). 
234. See 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 863 (2019) (describing treating physicians as hybrid fact-expert 
witnesses). 
235. These evidentiary problems can undermine liability as well as damages. See AM. JUR., supra note 233  
(“The medical record . . . is often a vital part of the medical evidence necessary to prove causation and the 
extent of disease or injury. . . .”). 
victim’s pain or suffering a numerical value, typically between one and five, and 
then multiply the economic damages by that figure.230 It is difficult to imagine a 
perfect method for translating physical and emotional suffering into monetary 
damages, but this particular approach builds in a bias against people whose harms 
are already devalued by the market.231 It exacerbates the legal system’s recognition 
of the economic value of a person as the primary indicator of their value overall.232 
This method magnifies the flaws in the economic damages calculation, resulting 
in the further devaluation of poor tenants’ claims. 
Finally, for one of the same reasons that poor people accumulate minimal 
economic damages—they possess few excess financial resources and so can spend 
little on addressing their harms—they face obstacles to proving non-economic 
damages. Efforts to avoid accumulation of expenses result in an absence of 
accumulated evidence. As an example, if poor people avoid medical treatment 
because of the cost, there will be no corresponding economic damages. While this 
contributes to the difficulty of attracting market-based lawyers to the cases. The 
way this plays out in connection with non-economic damages is even more 
concerning: families do experience the non-economic harm—they suffer from 
serious medical problems—but lack the proof, because they never got treated. 
Medical records can show injuries, 233  and treating practitioners can serve as 
witnesses to explain them,234 but if a tenant is prohibited by cost from seeking 
treatment, no such evidence will exist.235 
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That poor people receive relatively low awards, even when they experience 
severe suffering, is troubling from both a moral and a practical perspective. 
Devaluing the suffering of poor individuals raises serious questions related to 
equality of dignity and personhood. On a practical level, such devaluation 
exacerbates the challenges poor people face in accessing legal representation in the 
private market.  
3. Fee-Shifting Falters 
An important market mechanism designed to enforce laws on behalf of clients 
whose cases do not generate significant contingency fees is the fee-shifting 
statute.236 In select areas of public interest law, legislatures have included fee-
shifting provisions that permit “prevailing plaintiffs” to recover their attorneys’ 
fees, as a supplement to other relief, from defendants.237 Statutes with fee-shifting 
provisions span a variety of subjects, from civil rights and workers’ rights to 
environmental protection and freedom of information.238  
The consumer protection and fair housing statutes discussed earlier include 
such provisions,239 but fee-shifting is underutilized in the enforcement of housing 
standards. 240
Because the subject has received inadequate attention, there is no empirical evidence on this 
point. A Westlaw search in July 2019 identified only twenty-six cases brought by tenants raising FHA 
claims related to substandard conditions, and in only ten of those cases were the tenants represented by 
counsel. Cf. Complaint, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. F’dl Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n., 3:16-cv-06969 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
5, 2016) (alleging Fannie Mae violated the FHA in failing to maintain foreclosed properties in Black and 
Latinx neighborhoods, while maintaining properties in white neighborhoods), 
https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Lawsuit-Against-Fannie-Mae.pdf. 
 The absence of litigation in this area is particularly telling with 
respect to violations of the warranty of habitability. With the assistance of counsel, 
establishing substandard conditions and notice to the landlord should be relatively 
easy. While the damages under current doctrine may be low, the likelihood of 
“prevailing” on liability should be extremely high, and recovery of fees should 
therefore be virtually certain.  
What explains the absence of housing standards enforcement funded by fee-
shifting? One possible explanation is that consumer protections and fair housing 
claims are not widely available. State consumer protection statutes vary, and the 
applicability of federal consumer law to substandard rental housing is 
underdeveloped.241 The fair housing requirements of the federal FHA are uniform, 
but not all substandard housing involves discrimination on the basis of a protected 
characteristic. 242  White lawyers might also minimize the availability of FHA 
claims due to a tendency to find race-neutral explanations for conduct.243 Once 
                                                                                                                         
236. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court, 
Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 309–10 (1990). 
237. See Sabbeth, supra note 193, at 465–68. 
238. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, app. at 43–51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing fee-
shifting statutes). 
239. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3613(c)(2), 12205 (2012); supra pp. 116–18.  
240. 
241. See supra notes 151, 152 and accompanying text.  
242. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1988).  
243. See Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering: Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and Rule of Law, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2091–93 (2005) (“The professional ideal that lawyers and law should be neutral 
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recognized, discrimination can still be difficult to prove, which can lessen its 
attractiveness to attorneys relying on a fee-shifting provision that depends on 
prevailing.244  
The skittishness about funding work through fee-shifting might also reflect 
concerns about courts’ willingness to award reasonable fees. Evidence reveals 
judicial skepticism that public interest lawyers, particularly lawyers representing 
poor people with low-value cases,245 deserve to be paid.246 In recent decades, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has made this clear. First, the Supreme Court has permitted 
defense attorneys to make “sacrifice offers” that require plaintiffs’ counsel to give 
up attorneys’ fees in exchange for getting injunctive or monetary relief for their 
clients.247 This has resulted in lawyers resorting to contingency fee options in their 
retainers to avoid walking away with nothing.248 Unfortunately, this means neither 
the client nor the lawyer receives the full amount to which they are entitled, and it 
fails as an enforcement mechanism when the monetary damages are too low for 
the contingency arrangement to be sufficient. Second, the Supreme Court has 
applied a cramped interpretation to the definition of a “prevailing” party: even if a 
lawsuit is the catalyst that causes a defendant to change its conduct, no fees will 
be paid to the plaintiff’s attorney unless the change resulted from a court order.249 
Third, Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the market value of attorneys’ 
fees under fee-shifting statutes in ways that keep them relatively low,250 making 
enforcement under such statutes increasingly infeasible.251  
B. Public Enforcement 
In light of the many challenges for market-based enforcement of poor tenants’ 
rights, public enforcement offers distinct advantages. First and foremost, public 
actors function largely independent of the market. 252  As the above analysis 
demonstrates, market-based enforcement mechanisms do not address poor tenants’ 
right to safe housing. While many areas of public interest litigation—from classic 
                                                                                                                         
provides support for preferring a race-neutral strategy if readily available . . . [and] supports the tendency 
of whites to avoid confronting racial issues.”). 
244. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Consumer Remedies for Civil Rights, 99 B.U. L. REV. 587, 602–
08 (2019) (describing difficulty of establishing housing discrimination). 
245. See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining why poor tenants’ cases are deemed to hold little value). 
246. See Sabbeth, supra note 193, at 491–92 (highlighting Supreme Court’s resistance to the notion 
that public interest lawyers should earn market rates). 
247. See Evans. v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 729-30, 742-43 (1986). 
248. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to 
Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 114–15. 
249. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The 
Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1099–1104 
(2007) (explaining the decision).  
250. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Counsel for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 734 
(1987) (restricting the availability of risk enhancements in the calculation of fees). 
251. See id. at 735–36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 249, at 
1121–23, 1129 (providing empirical evidence that the Court’s interpretation of fee-shifting statutes has 
limited lawyers’ ability to pursue public interest litigation). 
252. The market does affect government enforcement indirectly, to the extent that agency resources 
depend on a tax base, which, in turn, reflects the local economy. The governments of New York City and 
San Francisco, which have created a statutory right to eviction defense lawyers, have been able to do so in 
part because of the wealth in those cities.  
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civil rights to environmental justice and numerous other subjects—may not be as 
robustly supported by the market as some might hope, the rights of poor people 
are systematically deprived of market support.253 Although the law recognizes 
poor tenants’ right to safe housing, it does not fully recognize their injuries. It fails 
to translate poor people’s suffering into economic terms. The absence of an 
economic translation of the harm makes the claims of poor people unattractive to 
market-driven lawyers. In other words, the market for lawyers, as currently 
constituted, devalues the importance of poor people’s legal claims. As a result, 
mechanisms independent from the market are crucial to addressing violations of 
law against poor people. Government actors carry this promise. 
More specifically, government actors are likely to pursue forms of relief that 
market actors neglect. Because of their freedom to define success independent of 
monetary damages, government actors may be more likely to pursue injunctions. 
While contingency fee lawyers receive little reward for time spent on obtaining 
and enforcing orders to correct substandard housing, the salaries of government 
attorneys are disconnected from individual cases.254 Government lawyers need not 
maximize monetary awards or face financial pressure to move on to the next case. 
Instead, their offices may celebrate and promote those who win injunctive relief or 
change industry practices.255  
Government actors also benefit from statutory authority that allows them to 
utilize different theories of recovery and pursue broad relief with the potential for 
significant deterrent effect.256 They can often pursue litigation even if individuals 
lack standing.257 If a landlord repeatedly fails to address a home in significant 
disrepair, a court may impose a lien or even order government seizure of the 
property.258  
Government actors may be especially capable of handling their subject matter. 
Public agencies operate as specialized, long-term, “repeat players.”259 That status 
gives them expertise with respect to both the substance of the docket and strategy 
in the fora. If cases continue over multiple years, with battles against landlords 
who drag their feet about compliance, government lawyers may be more prepared 
than market-based counsel to stay the course and ensure that any loose ends get 
tied up properly. 
In spite of these advantages, government agencies have failed to fill the 
enforcement gap for poor tenants living in unsafe housing. This is for at least two 
reasons. The first is a matter of political will that can potentially shift at the right 
                                                                                                                         
253. See supra Part III.A (explaining why market-based enforcement systematically neglects poor 
tenants). 
254. See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 187, at 154. 
255. See Selmi, supra note 188, at 1422; but see Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit 
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 854 (2014) (suggesting motives influence state and federal agencies in 
litigation involving huge sums). 
256. See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 454–55 
(2007). 
257. In some jurisdictions, tenants who move out may lack standing to pursue injunctive relief 
(assuming they still have the incentive).  
258. See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text. 
259. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 107–14 (1974). 
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historical moment.260 The second is fundamental to the operation of government 
litigation and requires a structural solution.  
1. Agency Underenforcement   
In many municipalities or counties, a local government agency carries the 
responsibility of enforcing minimum housing codes but has failed to do so.261 
Agency officials are known to be stretched too thin to perform well. 262  The 
common view is that agencies’ enforcement failures result from insufficient 
funding and agency culture.263 While this description may be accurate on its terms, 
deeper critique is needed to unearth the source of the problem. Agency failure is 
not a bug, but rather a feature, of the political system in which it operates.264 
The underenforcement of housing standards is a classic case of 
“underenforcement”265 on behalf of communities that have not been a political 
priority.266 As Alexandra Natapoff has highlighted, poor people do not enjoy law 
enforcement resources in proportion to their numbers in the population.267 At the 
same time that poor people of color are disproportionately targeted by criminal law 
enforcement, the harms they experience receive inadequate attention. 268 
Underenforcement is “a form of social disinvestment”269  that results from a lack 
of political power combined with judgments about “how much disorder, decay, 
and underenforcement poor communities should be required to tolerate.”270  
For a government to fund its housing safety agencies insufficiently is to make 
a distributive decision and a political choice.271 This act deprives one sector of the 
public of support and, intentionally or unintentionally, allows another sector to 
exact profits through flagrant violations of law.272 Even without favoritism toward 
                                                                                                                         
260. See Waterstone, supra note 256, at 451-52 (arguing that funding is flexible and may respond to 
public demand). 
261. See, e.g., Uzdavines, supra note 97, at 161 (“The local code enforcement department lacks the 
resources, manpower, and strategic plan to deal with blight on a massive scale.”).  
262. See id. at 173 (highlighting the practice of addressing superficial conditions while ignoring 
serious dangers, because the former are easier to resolve). 
263. See id.; Ackerman, supra note 16, at 1093–94; see also Waterstone, supra note 256, at 436 
(“[E]xisting academic accounts tend to treat public enforcement as chronically ineffective and incapable 
of improvement.”). 
264 . See Robert A. Kagan, Regulatory Enforcement, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 383, 391 (David H. Rosenbloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994) (describing 
theory of “political environment” determining enforcement approach). 
265. See Natapoff, supra note 23, passim. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 1723. 
268. Id. Natapoff argues that policing is special, but her insights apply also to civil enforcement. Cf. 
id. at 1768 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court interprets policing to be a “public service like health 
care, trash collection, or housing” but arguing the Supreme Court got it wrong and policing is different). 
269. Id. at 1730.  
270. Id.  
271. See Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1729–30. If that decision results in a racially disparate impact 
(or is intentionally based on race), it could potentially give rise to FHA claims against the municipality. 
See Anthony Alfieri, Poor, Black, and Gone: Civil Rights Law’s Inner City Crisis, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 629, 669 (2019) (describing FHA challenge to city’s enforcement policy). 
272. See DESMOND, supra note 11, at 250 (“Urban landlords quickly realized that piles of money 
could be made by creating slums.”); id. at 308 (“The annual income of perhaps the worst trailer park in the 
fourth-poorest city in America is 30 times that of his tenants working full-time for minimum wages and 55 
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the offenders, indifference leads to systematic underenforcement of laws 
protecting communities perceived as politically weak. 273  Poor tenants have 
historically lacked political power,274 and, as a result, housing code enforcement 
agencies have been starved of funds. 
State and federal actors equipped with more resources could pursue certain 
categories of housing conditions enforcement, but, perhaps for the same reasons 
that the local agencies are under-resourced, the better-funded government units 
have devoted relatively little attention to the concerns of poor tenants.275 Agencies 
responsible for consumer protection and civil rights could take on substandard 
conditions cases that violate consumer protection or antidiscrimination statutes.276 
Yet they rarely do. In particular, consumer protection agencies and the consumer 
fraud bureaus of attorneys general have not generally recognized tenants as among 
the consumers they are tasked with protecting. 277  Although federal and state 
enforcement could make a significant impact on the real estate industry, the 
concerns of poor tenants have not been their priority.278 
2. Tenants are Not Clients 
Even with positive improvements, agencies could not provide a full substitute 
for private counsel. The fundamental problem with government enforcement is that 
government lawyers do not represent individual tenants. Government agencies 
represent the government entity or the people at large. 
a. No Client Autonomy 
Government lawyers do not take direction from tenants as clients. Tenants do 
not define the substantive outcomes to be pursued, whether and for what to settle, 
or any other aspect of the enforcement. The people victimized by the violations of 
law function only as third-party beneficiaries, not primary agents, of the action. 
Tenants are not parties and might not even be called as witnesses.279 Litigation can 
proceed without them, as inspectors can document the conditions, and, in fact, the 
seemingly neutral inspectors’ testimony is likely to be trusted more than that of 
tenants.280 One might argue that the government’s ability to proceed with litigation 
                                                                                                                         
times the annual income of his tenants receiving welfare or SSI.”); id. at 175–76 (describing income gap 
between landlords and tenants).   
273. Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1746. 
274. See Julie Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of 
Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 632 (2008). 
275. See Sirota, supra note 152, at 8–9 (documenting that consumer protection offices neglect tenants, 
in comparison with homeowners and other consumers, and seeking to explain the disparity). A Westlaw 
search also reveals remarkably few conditions-related FHA cases by the U.S. Department of Justice. Cf. 
United States v. Cochran, 39 F. Supp. 3d 719 (E.D.N.C. 2014). 
276. See supra p. 118. 
277. See Sirota, supra note 152, at 6. 
278. But see infra note 336 (highlighting exceptions). 
279. An affected individual may seek to intervene but would presumably need a lawyer to understand 
how to do so. This begs the question of how to provide such lawyers.  
280. See also Steinberg, supra note 19, at 1060 (describing high rate of rulings in favor of tenants 
when inspectors confirmed substandard conditions).   
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absent tenant participation makes enforcement more efficient. Yet in so doing, it 
squeezes out the tenants’ voices and control. 
Even if a government lawyer sought to empower affected tenants, the structure 
of the representation poses a challenge. Government actors are charged with 
serving the broader public good and generally lack the authority to pursue claims 
and obtain relief for individuals. Academic literature has explored this in the 
criminal context, where victims and complainants are sometimes surprised to 
discover that prosecutors’ goals diverge from their own.281 When a conflict arises 
between a prosecutor’s understanding of justice for the public and the goals of a 
victim, the prosecutor’s ethical obligations require prioritizing the public 
interest.282 A similar dynamic exists in areas of civil enforcement. 
If agency lawyers were charged with seeking relief for individual tenants, this 
could create ethical tensions between the lawyers’ obligations to those tenants and 
to the goals of the broader public as defined by the agency’s mission. For example, 
a landlord might make a settlement offer that includes improvements to a property 
in exchange for paying lower monetary damages. If the agency’s goal is to cure a 
neighborhood of unsafe housing, the lawyer must push for the broad repairs, even 
if this leaves the tenants’ monetary goals shortchanged. The lawyers might feel 
compelled to sacrifice individuals’ interests on behalf of the goals of the agency. 
This problem has already arisen in the context of the FHA, one of the few 
statutes that charges government actors with simultaneous obligations to the public 
and to individual victims. The FHA charges U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
attorneys with seeking monetary relief for victims of housing discrimination, 
alongside broader injunctive relief and civil penalties. Unfortunately, the triangular 
relationship between the DOJ attorney, the individual, and the public “client” 
creates ethical difficulties, 283  which the lawyers generally resolve against the 
individuals.284  
b. Relief Tenants Don’t Want  
One of the concrete implications of tenants not controlling enforcement 
activity is that government agencies may pursue avenues that contradict tenants’ 
wishes. An agency might pursue a vacancy order and demolition of a property, 
forcing tenants from their homes when they would prefer an approach that allows 
them to stay.285 Many municipal efforts to counter “blight” have resulted in the 
displacement of residents of color without regard for the impact of uprooting 
                                                                                                                         
281. See, e.g., Paul Butler, How Can You Prosecute Those People?, in HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT 
THOSE PEOPLE? 15, 20–21 (Abbe Smith & Monroe H. Freedman eds., 2013). 
282. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A prosecutor has 
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).  
283. See Gaetke & Schwemm, supra note 58, at 339–40, 340 n.78. 
284. Id. 
285. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 271, at 633 (identifying such orders as part of a broad pattern of 
“displacement,” which he defines as “the involuntary removal of tenants and homeowners caused by 
evictions and foreclosures, building condemnations and demolitions, and government slum clearance and 
urban renewal or revitalization”); id. at 659 (describing condemnation and demolition as “mass eviction”); 
id. at 661–62 (describing tenants’ reluctance to leave their neighborhood despite “a continuing cycle of 
building condemnation and demolition”). 
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communities. 286  Although this Article rejects the notion that enforcement of 
housing standards necessarily results in homelessness,287 enforcement endeavors 
must be thoughtfully conceived and executed. Without a structure to support tenant 
participation in enforcement,288 tenant priorities can get overlooked. 
Just as tenants might want to take enforcement in a different direction, they 
might prefer to avoid it. Poor people, especially poor people of color, might 
recognize the court system as a place that is dangerous and unfair to them.289 They 
might prefer to stay away from courts and instead pursue direct action or other 
means of political resistance.290 Alternatively, they might choose to engage in 
litigation but just as one component in a larger strategy to gain media attention or 
further legislative goals, not to obtain traditional forms of relief.291 Such priorities 
should inform litigation strategy. Yet government agencies promote their own 
objectives. 
c. Relief Tenants Want is Unavailable 
Litigation to enforce housing standards can result in a range of remedies, and 
lawyers from different sectors vary in the forms they prioritize or even have 
authority to pursue. As discussed above, government lawyers are especially well-
positioned to pursue injunctions, while market-based lawyers might neglect to do 
so. Yet most government agencies are not authorized to obtain relief for individual 
tenants and do not win them monetary awards.292 
See, e.g., N.Y.C. OFFICE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 49, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/services/civiljustice/OCJ%202016%20Annual%20Repo
rt%20FINAL_08_29_2016.pdf (noting that local agency lawyer does not represent the tenant or her specific 
interests and cannot argue for individual compensation). Cf. Press Release, Illinois State Office of the Attn’y 
Gen., Madigan Announces $1 Million Settlement with Safeguard Properties: Homeowners Illegally Locked Out 
of Homes to Receive Restitution (June 3, 2015), 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015_06/20150603.html (announcing settlement that 
agreement that included restitution). 
Tenants generally receive no monetary compensation when government 
agencies succeed, even if those tenants faithfully paid rent for years. In most 
jurisdictions, the statutory authority of local government actors deputizes them to 
file suit seeking injunctions and modest civil penalties paid to the agency, but it 
does not contemplate monetary awards for the tenants occupying the property that 
                                                                                                                         
286. Id. at 652–62 (highlighting Miami’s displacement of poor Black communities). 
287. See supra Part II.B.3. 
288. See infra Part IV.C.2, 3 (identifying mechanisms that would support tenants who want to 
intervene).  
289. See Rebecca Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses 
of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 112, 126–27 (Pascoe Pleasence et al., 
eds., 2007) (identifying non-monetary reasons why people do not seek legal solutions to housing 
problems); Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1288–
1312 (2016) (describing additional non-monetary reasons why poor people, especially poor people of color, 
avoid courts).  
290. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 106–09 (describing historical examples of rent 
strikes and anti-eviction direct action such as organizing squats, breaking locks, blocking marshals, 
guarding possessions thrown in the street, and moving evicted tenants back into their residences). 
291. See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 548, 555 (2004). 
292. 
134 The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy [Vol. XXVII 
 
is the subject of the litigation.293 Government actors do not seek rent abatements 
or other monetary compensation for tenants who have been harmed.  
Obtaining monetary relief may be important to tenants. Although the amount 
may be too low to attract market-based representation, it is likely to be significant 
to the individuals involved. Recall that the most common method of calculating 
damages is based on a rent abatement,294 and that rent occupies a growing share of 
household budgets.295  
Rent is currently so great an expense that many are unable to meet it. While 
public benefits have decreased and wages have stagnated, housing costs have 
climbed exponentially.296 As a result of this yawning gap, the number of eviction 
proceedings has increased dramatically.297 Sizeable rent abatements can make all 
the difference in preventing eviction.298  
Monetary awards may also help to cover other costs. Tenants report difficulty 
paying other bills because they shift resources to pay their rent. 299  Whether 
prospective, until a landlord conducts repairs, or retroactive, as compensation for 
prior months of uninhabitability, rent relief could give these tenants a chance to 
meet other needs.  
If rent rates continue to rise, so too should rent abatements, calculated in 
proportion to the rent amounts. The absolute value of the monetary awards should 
rise. These potential increases in awards make enforcing tenants’ right to recover 
them that much more important. Yet neither public agencies nor private lawyers 
are prepared to represent tenants seeking such recovery. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS     
Public and private actors have failed to bridge the gap between the rule of law 
and the reality for tenants in substandard housing. This enforcement gap produces 
a negative feedback loop. Tenants’ underenforced rights atrophy and become more 
difficult to enforce. That difficulty makes advocates less likely to attempt 
enforcement. The absence of enforcement creates individual and collective 
problems with respect to equality and the rule of law. This Part will identify some 
of the most troubling implications of the enforcement gap; argue that legislatures 
                                                                                                                         
293. Although local government agencies do not have the power to seek individual relief on behalf 
of tenants, if federal or state actors were to pursue litigation, they might in some cases be able to obtain 
individual restitution. See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 533–39 
(2011) (describing powers of Federal Trade Commission to obtain relief for victims); see, e.g., N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 75-15.1, 114-2.4A(b)(2)(b) (2018) (authorizing state attorney general to obtain restitution for 
members of the public). 
294. See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
295. See sources cited supra note 104. 
296. See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., supra note 104, at 1–6; see also Colleen Shanahan & 
Anna Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 DAEDALUS, 128, 1293–40 (2019) 
(describing growth in court dockets as attributable to rise in inequality and loss of social welfare programs). 
297. See DESMOND, supra note 11, at 303. 
298. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing connections between eviction defense counsel and appointed 
counsel who can pursue litigation affirmatively). 
299. See Matthew Desmond & Rachel T. Kimbro, Eviction’s Fallout: Housing, Hardship, and Health, 
94 SOC. FORCES 295, 296 (2015) (“As households are forced to devote a larger portion of their income to 
housing expenses, their budget shares for food, school supplies, medication, transportation, and other 
necessities shrink.”). 
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have both the power and the obligation to address them; and, finally, propose a set 
of strategies to do so.  
A. Underenforcement Snowballing   
The enforcement gap results in a snowball effect, which systematically 
excludes poor tenants from access to the legal system and “underdevelops” the law 
in areas where it could protect them. The accumulated underenforcement of 
tenants’ housing rights not only exacerbates social welfare problems but also 
threatens the rule of law. 
Because neither the private nor the public sector represents poor tenants 
enforcing their rights, these members of the polity are effectively excluded from 
access to the civil justice system.300 To be clear, poor tenants are involved in 
litigation, but they have little opportunity to participate affirmatively. Every year, 
millions of tenants appear in court as defendants in eviction proceedings, but rarely 
do they bring suit as plaintiffs. 301
See EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (documenting numbers 
of evictions across the United States). 
 Defendants can raise counterclaims, but 
appearing as a defendant carries inherent disadvantages.302 Using the law as a 
sword, rather than a shield, can shift power between parties and alter the status quo 
of social relations.303 The enforcement gap prevents poor tenants from using courts 
to their benefit.  
This exclusion from the privileges of the civil justice system carries 
ramifications for individuals and groups. On the individual level, it means the 
courts are available to enforce the rights of some members of society but not others. 
In the aggregate, it results in systematic exclusion of poor people, especially 
women of color, whose participation in democracy is already disadvantaged. The 
exclusionary impact of the enforcement gap means marginalized groups receive 
inadequate attention from the legal system, thereby contributing to their 
marginalization. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that substandard housing befalls a 
specific population.304 Substandard housing is visited upon poor people the most, 
with women and children of color experiencing it disproportionately.305 They are 
vulnerable to categories of abuse and exploitation that other people do not 
encounter. The neglect of cases challenging substandard housing conditions means 
not only that these individuals and groups are denied the opportunity to have their 
problems addressed but also that entire subjects of law are ignored.  
In a common law, precedent-based system, neglect of a category of cases 
results in the underdevelopment and distortion of law. Because poor people are 
                                                                                                                         
300. See ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 5 (2017) (“Limitations on lawsuits have the 
practical effect of limiting individual rights, because lawsuits are the central mechanism for enforcing and 
protecting rights in the United States.”). 
301. 
302. See Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 109-16 (identifying limits of defense lawyering and analyzing the 
extent to which counterclaims can overcome these limits); infra pp. 144–45 (describing role of eviction 
defense lawyers raising defenses and counterclaims). 
303. See Florence Wagman Roisman, How Litigation Can Lead to Substantial Relief for Clients and 
Significant Social Change, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 759 (2005). 
304. See supra Part II.A.2. 
305. See supra notes 91, 93, 95, 97, 100, 109, 110, 112–119 and accompanying text. 
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particularly likely to experience substandard housing and particularly unlikely to 
hire counsel, the problems of substandard housing receive little legal analysis. 
Private lawyers do not devote time and attention to raising, researching, or 
advocating for applicability of the laws protecting tenants’ right to safe housing. 
They do not press judges to refine the doctrine with respect to these legal violations 
and the specific harms that flow from them. They do not appeal to higher courts 
and therefore miss out on opportunities to strengthen existing doctrine and create 
precedent.306 
Although lawyers for government agencies do pursue some housing conditions 
cases, as a technical matter, they do not enforce tenants’ right to safe housing. The 
statutes and regulations that government agencies enforce are related to but distinct 
from the statutory and common law claims of tenants.307 When government actors 
engage in enforcement, they do not interpret or advance the law governing tenants’ 
private claims.308 
This leaves vast areas of law underdeveloped. These include, at minimum, 
liability and damages under the common law of torts and contracts, along with 
related questions of evidence and civil procedure. Consider the monetary relief to 
which tenants are entitled for violations of the warranty of habitability. Courts have 
historically awarded relatively little compensation for such violations. 309  Yet 
advocacy by skilled counsel might expand judges’ understanding of the value of 
the harms that poor tenants experience. The historical imbalance between tenants 
and landlords regarding levels of representation likely explains courts’ current 
interpretations of such awards.310 We can only imagine how the law and court 
culture might look if both parties had enjoyed decades of equality of 
representation. 
Instead, the system produces snowballing inequality. The depression of poor 
tenants’ monetary awards results in the systemic undervaluation of the types of 
injuries that recur for this group of people. The undervaluation recreates and 
perpetuates itself in judge and jury awards, settlements, and attorneys’ assessments 
of the economic value of cases, all of which inform whether individuals can find 
lawyers to take on the representation. This is magnified by the private bar’s 
disproportionate perception of the claims of people of color, especially Black 
women, as too difficult.311 Given that poor women of color, and their children, 
                                                                                                                         
306. See Cotton, supra note 19, at 85 (highlighting the absence of appeals of housing conditions 
decisions). 
307. See supra Part II.B.1. 
308. Evidence also suggests limited interpretation of the statutes the agencies are charged with 
enforcing. See Campbell, supra note 98, at 836 (“The definition of what constitutes a ‘habitable’ residence 
has remained remarkably consistent over the years - with very little evolution even though society itself 
has changed dramatically.”). 
309. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing undervaluation and devaluation of tenants’ claims). 
310. See Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon Movement from the Dynamics of 
Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 697, 714–15 (2006); Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 78–79. 
311. See Myrick, Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 195, at 118–19 (showing that plaintiffs’ lawyers 
disproportionately reject African Americans because of fee structures that devalue their cases); see also 
CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 76, at 6, 178 (noting that people of color disproportionately carry 
markers like criminal convictions that defense counsel can use against them); Chris Chambers Goodman, 
Shadowing the Bar: Attorneys’ Own Implicit Bias, 28 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 18, 40–42 (2018) 
(describing implicit biases that shape attorneys’ assessments of communication styles, credibility, and 
strategy).  
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comprise large numbers of the victims of injuries due to housing conditions, claims 
related to housing conditions are repeatedly devalued. In a legal system that 
requires private individuals to cover the costs of enforcement on their behalf, the 
problems of poor tenants remain unaddressed, and the laws protecting them wither 
on the vine. 
Poor people are thereby disadvantaged at least fivefold. First, they are the 
group most likely to get stuck in substandard housing conditions and suffer the 
consequent physical, emotional, cognitive, and economic harms. Second, if they 
seek compensation for their injuries, factfinders who recognize their claims at all 
will compensate them less than wealthier tenants, even if they suffer similar or 
worse conditions. Third, the expectation of low awards makes poor tenants’ cases 
unattractive to market-based legal representatives. Because the U.S. civil justice 
system relies primarily on private parties to cover the costs of civil enforcement,312 
the low economic value assigned to their cases results in deprivation of access to 
that system. Fourth, from a deterrence perspective, the inability of poor tenants to 
access the legal system means that landlords have the fewest incentives to maintain 
safe conditions in poor people’s homes. Fifth, in the absence of attorneys to pursue 
these matters, tenants’ legal rights atrophy, thereby exacerbating many of the other 
problems.  
B. Government Obligations and Opportunities 
Government agencies are not the only actors who can pursue enforcement, and 
arguably not the best to do so,313 but in their legislative capacity, governments can 
and should mitigate the snowballing underenforcement of housing standards. The 
most obvious reason is that widespread substandard housing creates a social 
welfare problem.314 Such conditions affect not only individual residents but also 
their communities. 315  Indeed, the threat to public health and public coffers 
motivated passage of the first minimal housing codes.316 Governments possess not 
only a moral responsibility but a practical incentive to protect social welfare.317 
Further, government entities have constructed, and continue to fortify, the 
enforcement gap and therefore ought to take steps to remedy it. The private market 
                                                                                                                         
312. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing traditional American rule of parties covering costs of litigation 
including representation). 
313 . Cf. Waterstone, supra note 256, at 451–53 (noting concerns about “agency capture” and 
explaining that the “diffusion of enforcement power” between public and private actors “avoids some 
capture problems, to the extent they exist”). 
314 . See supra Part II.A.1 (describing physical, emotional, cognitive, and economic harms to 
individuals, as well as secondary and aggregate social effects). 
315 . Id.; Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1717–18, 1729–30 (describing “social and economic 
deterioration” and damage to democratic legitimacy in “underenforcement zones”). 
316. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 122 (“But contrary to the myth of state benevolence, 
the real reasons [for adoption of housing codes] were elites’ twin fears of disease and uprising among the 
city’s growing working class.”); id. at 123–24 (showing reformers emphasized that poor people would 
disrupt the public peace and tax the public coffers in the absence of improvements to housing quality). 
317. See Waterstone, supra note 256, at 454 (“[W]hen the private market fails to provide a particular 
public good, the government has an obligation to do so for the betterment of its people.”). 
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for lawyers, 318 and the doctrinal rules that make substandard conditions cases 
unattractive to market-based lawyers,319 are products of law.  
So too is the housing market.320 David Madden and Peter Marcuse explain this 
as follows: 
The government is involved in making housing possible in 
multiple ways. The state plans and builds the streets on which 
homes are located. It certifies the materials and techniques out of 
which houses are contracted. It regulates, or directly supplies, the 
infrastructure for electricity, water, sewage, and transportation 
upon which housing depends. It provides the means to enforce 
contracts and define the legal relationships that make possible the 
buying, selling, producing, and leasing of housing. It enforces the 
legal sanctity of the home from intrusion and violation. It 
constructs and protects the property rights that made landlordism 
and tenancy possible. It influences the extent to which capital is 
used for housing or diverted from it. . . . Government does not 
intervene in an autonomous private housing market. The state can 
more accurately be said to privilege some groups or classes over 
others. . . . The question will always be how the state should act 
toward housing, not whether it should do so.321 
Finally, governments have moral and practical reasons to promote the rule of 
law.322 Even if one were to accept the extreme position that poor people in the 
United States have no social welfare rights, they nonetheless possess a basic right 
of equality in relation to the rule of law in a democratic society.323 The executive 
branch of government, unlike private actors, is responsible for executing the 
laws.324 Governments have a monopoly on and responsibility for “lawfulness as a 
socially valuable good.” 325  Lawfulness is undermined by snowballing 
underenforcement.326  
                                                                                                                         
318. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules? in LAWYERS ETHICS AND 
THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 18, 18–24 (Susan D. Carle, ed., 2005) (highlighting how lawyers 
structure the legal market). 
319. See supra Part III.A. 
320 . See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 91, at 64–65 (describing how the federal government 
subsidized property ownership for whites only). 
321. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 39, at 141–42; see also DESMOND, supra note 11, at 307 
(“Exploitation within the housing market relies on government support.”). 
322. See Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1721 (highlighting “the state’s role in maintaining individual 
security, social stability, and the rule of law”); Cotton, supra note 19, at 61 (highlighting that when “the 
rule of law and equal justice under law” are not honored, “the damage is not simply to those who are misled 
and misused by the system, but also to the reputation and viability of the system itself”). 
323. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (Equal Protection Clause); Weissman, supra note 45, at 743–52 
(describing governmental obligation to promote the rule of law, particularly for the protection of poor 
people).  
324. See Waterstone, supra note 256, at 453. 
325. Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1721. 
326. Id. at 1718 (“Failing to maintain an atmosphere of legality, [government] turns its back on victim 
classes twice: first, by denying them material protective resources, and second, by depriving them of a 
robust, responsive legal system.”). 
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C. Filling the Gap 
Governments should take responsibility for enforcement through direct and 
indirect action. They should bolster the enforcement of executive agencies while 
also strengthening support for market-based enforcement. Combining public and 
private approaches to enforcement allows each sector to make up for the shortfalls 
of the other. 327  It also provides an extra check on public and private 
mismanagement of housing. 328  The utility of specific programs will vary by 
geography, public resources, and political pressures. This section identifies three 
approaches that policymakers can consider. Given the strengths and weaknesses 
of each, some combination of all three will be most effective.  
1. Robust Public Actors 
Government enforcement is arguably the best method for addressing 
widespread patterns of misconduct.329 Public agencies are particularly well-suited 
to obtain and enforce injunctive orders or consent decrees requiring owners to 
correct substandard conditions.330 When equipped with political and economic 
resources, government agencies can make a significant mark, resulting in the 
reform of entire industries.331  
For public agencies to enforce housing standards, there will need to be changes 
in agency culture. For state and federal agencies, that may require revising 
priorities. This Article aspires to encourage state and federal agencies to take a 
harder look at substandard housing as an area that deserves their attention. 
Cultural change in local agencies will likely require increased funds. An 
infusion of resources could allow agencies to hire more staff and give them more 
support. Higher salaries and growing personnel could lead to more comradery and 
lower caseloads. Such investments could produce more zealous advocacy and 
greater successes, improving morale and attracting talented new people to join the 
team. To the extent that lawyers currently view housing enforcement as a relatively 
unsophisticated area of practice, that perception is likely symptomatic of the 
underenforcement snowball: resources have historically been invested elsewhere 
and the law has atrophied. Agency investments are policy choices that are not only 
influenced by, but also influencers of, reputations. They can and do change in 
response to political forces.332 
Current policymakers’ interest in housing affordability, underscored by recent 
successes of tenants’ rights advocates, 333  can result in the necessary political 
capital. Some of the cities with the worst housing inequality—like New York City 
                                                                                                                         
327. See supra Part III (explaining shortfalls of public and private sector enforcement of poor tenants’ 
rights). 
328. See Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and Support, 25 YALE. 
J.L. & FEMINISM 319 (2014) (highlighting how interactions with government institutions pose heightened 
risks for poor women of color). 
329. See Waterstone, supra note 256, at 455. 
330. See supra pp. 131-32. 
331. See Selmi, supra note 188, at 1441, 1450–51.  
332. See, e.g., id., at 1422–23 (discussing changes in enforcement activity between Bush and Clinton 
administrations). 
333. See supra pp. 104-05. 
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and San Francisco—have indicated an ability and willingness to invest in tenants’ 
rights, and others have begun to follow suit.334 At the same time, the attorneys 
general offices in some of these jurisdictions have begun tackling more political 
litigation,335 
See Ben Christopher, Fastest Litigant in the West, CALMATTERS (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://calmatters.org/justice/2019/04/california-sues-trump-more-becerra-lawsuit-tracker-update 
(highlighting increase in state attorneys general suits against federal government). 
and a few have begun pursuing landlords.336 
See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General James and 
Governor Cuomo Announce Lawsuit Against Queens Landlord for Violating Rent Stabilization Laws and 
Tenant Harassment (Mar. 1, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-james-and-governor-
cuomo-announce-lawsuit-against-queens-landlord; Sophie Kaplan, District Sued Landlord for Exposing 
Tenants to Lead Paint, WASH. TIMES (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jul/31/dc-attorney-general-karl-racine-sues-dc-landlord-f 
(describing suit by Attorney General Karl A. Racine). 
Capitalizing on this political moment is important, because government 
enforcement offers significant advantages over private enforcement. As discussed 
earlier, public actors are generally free from market pressures, possess the 
authority to pursue cases and relief unavailable to private parties, and function as 
specialized, long-term players.337 Enforcement by government actors also carries 
a special expressive function.338    
Beyond what any private actor can offer, a government lawyer conveys a 
message as a public actor who represents “the will of the people.”339 Enforcement 
conveys to both victims and bad actors that the violations, and the victims, are 
taken seriously.340 For a government actor to appear before a court and press for 
enforcement is to indicate that the perspectives of the victims are heard and 
validated by the polity.341 The reverse is also true. A failure of government actors 
to address violations of law may be interpreted as validating the lawbreaking and 
acceptance of harms that would not be accepted if visited upon other members of 
society.342 
The symbolic effect of government involvement takes on heightened meaning 
in the enforcement of poor people’s rights. Habitually ignored in favor of more 
                                                                                                                         
334. See supra note 34 and sources cited therein (describing expansion of tenants’ rights in New York 
State and California); supra note 41 and sources cited therein (highlighting new statutory rights to eviction 
defense lawyers, first established in New York City and San Francisco but since developing in Newark, 
Cleveland, Philadelphia, the District of Columbia, and other jurisdictions). 
335 . 
336. 
337. See supra pp. 131-32. As a practical matter, the involvement of a government agency can also 
encourage other government actors to provide support. For example, local governments with funds for 
repairs or tenant relocation may be more likely to contribute those resources when an agency has already 
identified the relevant property as a priority.  
338. See Waterstone, supra note 256, at 454 (arguing that “the expressive function of the law cannot 
be completely outsourced to private actors”). 
339. Id. at 453. 
340. Cf. Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1717 (“Underenforcement is a weak state response to lawbreaking 
as well as to victimization.”) 
341 . The message that victims’ concerns are taken seriously can resonate with the public, 
notwithstanding that government objectives might diverge from tenants’ interests. See supra Part III.B.2 
(explaining that government actors do not represent tenants and do not take direction from them); see also 
Butler, supra note 281, at 20 (noting “prosecutors don’t necessarily treat victims with dignity and 
kindness”).  
342. See Natapoff, supra note 23, at 1749 (“Underenforcement has expressive effects.”). 
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powerful actors, poor people do not typically enjoy enforcement resources.343 In 
popular narratives, poor neighborhoods are infamous for their lawlessness.344 
See Stephen Lurie, There’s No Such Thing as a Dangerous Neighborhood, CITYLAB (Feb. 25, 
2019), https://www.citylab.com/perspective/2019/02/broken-windows-theory-policing-urban-violence-
crime-data/583030 (describing popular perceptions of poor neighborhoods occupied primarily by people 
of color as dangerous). 
For 
government actors to take seriously law-breaking against, not only by, poor people 
would express recognition of them as valued members of society. This expressive 
value, as much as any concrete advantage, makes public enforcement essential. 
In spite of the many reasons to support robust public enforcement, it cannot 
address the inherent limits of government actors who, due to the nature of their 
position, do not generally represent the individual tenants. 345  For this reason, 
government enforcement must be supplemented by meaningful opportunities for 
tenants to participate and express their interests. Private lawyers are needed for 
tenants to initiate their own litigation or intervene in suits brought by government 
actors. The next two subsections describe two potential avenues for private 
representation.346   
2. Public-Private Hybrid: Appointed Counsel 
One option, building on the recent growth of appointment of counsel for 
defendants facing eviction,347 is funding for counsel for tenants on the affirmative, 
or plaintiff, side. States or municipalities could make available a pool of lawyers 
to represent tenants who wish to bring cases or intervene in suits brought by 
government actors. The pool could be employed by a non-profit, public interest 
office, which could contract with the government entity.348 The authority for the 
funds could involve a statutorily created right to appointment or, as a start, 
legislative commitment of funds.  
It should be recognized that non-profit organizations already do represent 
tenants in affirmative litigation challenging substandard housing conditions. Yet 
many offices prioritize eviction defense and other, arguably more urgent, 
categories of cases. Methodically and tenaciously pursuing affirmative relief when 
members of the public present emergencies can be difficult. Public funds and 
                                                                                                                         
343 . Id. (“[I]instances of systemic underenforcement are forms of official subordination and 
deprivation precisely because the state tolerates illegal harms against vulnerable groups that, for more 
favored constituents, would be intolerable.”). 
344. 
345. See supra III.B.2. 
346. Direct action and other social movement activities are other aspects of tenants’ participation. 
This Article is focused on participation in the enforcement litigation but recognizes that participation can 
take many forms. In the criminal context, scholars have suggested establishment of community 
representatives or revision of court rules to allow direct action by community members, although 
recognizing that such mechanisms could interfere with rule of law values. See Jocelyn Simonson, The 
Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 292–93 (2019).  
347. See NAT’L COALITION FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL, supra note 41. 
348 . See Laura Abel, Lessons from Gideon, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 527, 535 (2006) 
(describing criminal defense appointment systems). 
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special office units dedicated solely to such affirmative work could potentially 
make a difference.349 
Appointed counsel would offer a public-private hybrid for enforcement. The 
funds would have a public source, which would insulate them from market 
pressures, but the representation would be provided by private counsel, who would 
act at the direction of tenants as clients. Working within an entity devoted to the 
particular subject matter of poor people’s housing rights would help to ensure that 
the lawyers benefit from specialization and expertise like lawyers in a government 
agency. 350  Structuring the appointment through a contract with a non-profit 
organization devoted exclusively to such appointments can also ensure that the 
lawyers retain true independence from market pressures. 351  Unlike public 
agencies, appointed counsel would give tenants access to participate in, shape the 
goals of, and collect awards from enforcement. Private lawyers representing 
tenants’ claims would also counter the underdevelopment of tenants’ rights.  
The expressive impact of the appointment of counsel model deserves 
emphasis. While government enforcement carries inherent messages about the 
importance of the subject matter and the victims,352 appointment of counsel may 
offer other avenues for expression. The value of expression stems from both the 
message conveyed to listeners and the opportunity afforded the speaker. While 
government lawyers contribute to the former, it is not clear that they advance the 
latter. What appointed counsel does is provide a means for the individual to 
participate in the court system.353 The opportunity to bring one’s grievances to 
court, to articulate them in a public forum, and, quite literally, to speak truth to 
power, is significant in its own right.354 When a government covers the cost of this 
expression, while delegating execution to a private actor, it enhances and 
diversifies our democratic dialogue. 
Appointment of counsel for tenants to pursue substandard conditions claims 
would buttress the affordable housing efforts of legislatures already funding 
eviction defense. In eviction proceedings, represented tenants often raise the 
warranty of habitability as a defense or a counterclaim, but they are limited by the 
shape of the lawsuit against which they defend. If the basis of the eviction action 
is not the failure to pay rent, the warranty of habitability may not be a defense. For 
example, if the landlord bases the eviction on allegations of nuisance activity that 
breach the lease, the law generally will not recognize the condition of the premises 
as relevant to the landlord’s right to regain possession.355 To be sure, defendants 
                                                                                                                         
. See Paul R. Tremblay, “Acting a Very Moral God”: Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2475, 2517–21 (1999) (describing “division of labor” as a solution to the pull of the “rescue 
mission”). 
350. See Abel, supra note 348, at 535. 
351. Id. at 545. 
352. See supra pp. 142-43. 
353. See Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from 
Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260, 2263–64 (2013) (“While participation in a 
community has many facets, one of the most important is certainly participation in civic institutions such 
as the judicial system.”); id. at 2268 (highlighting “the Court’s intuitive understanding that inequality in 
access to the courts might distort the checks and balances underlying our democratic system”). 
354. See Robert Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A 
Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 865–68 (2002). 
355. In theory, a tenant could assert an equitable defense of estoppel or “unclean hands” due to the 
landlord’s failure to maintain the premises.    
349
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may raise counterclaims whose scope is broader than that of permissible defenses, 
and a tenant facing a nuisance action can raise substandard conditions through 
counterclaims. Yet some housing courts lack jurisdiction to hear counterclaims, 
and, further, waiting for a landlord to bring an eviction action before launching a 
tenant’s claims can create other disadvantages for the tenant.356  
Raising poor people’s rights in a defensive posture limits the capacity of the 
advocacy.357 At least five disadvantages result from raising claims as a defendant 
instead of as a plaintiff. First, tenants named as defendants in eviction proceedings 
get locked out of future housing opportunities, because the filing of the eviction 
action damages the tenant’s record even if the tenant ultimately prevails. 358 
Second, occupying the defensive position cedes to the landlord control over 
strategic decisions regarding whether and when to turn the dispute into a lawsuit.359 
If a tenant waits for the landlord to make the first move, urgent, dangerous 
conditions will languish unless and until the landlord chooses to initiate action. 
Moreover, waiting until the landlord is armed with a basis for eviction puts the 
tenant in a particularly vulnerable position from which to start the dispute 
resolution process. Third, plaintiffs choose the fora in which they file, and 
landlords file evictions in courts infamous for their lawlessness and landlord 
biases.360 If tenants were to initiate the cases, they could select state or federal 
courts that might be more hospitable to a thorough hearing of their claims. Fourth, 
compared with defendants, plaintiffs can more easily join their claims.361 Fifth, 
affirmative suits create more opportunities to coordinate with local activists and 
social movements. While some grassroots organizations have sought to rally 
around tenants facing eviction, plaintiff-tenants are typically in a better position to 
collaborate because of their control over the pace of the litigation.362 
Given the advantages of pursuing rights affirmatively, appointment of counsel 
to enforce housing standards deserves consideration. Lawyers have historically 
been appointed to criminal defendants, and more recently to civil defendants, but 
not to plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs.363 Yet appointment of lawyers to consult 
with and potentially initiate litigation on behalf of tenants could improve the 
enforcement of rights and safeguard the rule of law.  
3. Market-Based Improvement 
Legislative reform could also improve the private market of lawyers available 
to represent tenants enforcing the right to habitable housing. Legislation could 
enhance contingency fees for lawyers pursuing such cases. It could also strengthen 
fee-shifting statutes. Admittedly, the private market will never fully address 
enforcement of poor tenants’ rights. The tension between market values and poor 
                                                                                                                         
356. See Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 110–11, 112–113 nn.446–447. 
357. Id. at 110–11. 
358. See CARAMELLO & MAHLBERG, supra note 111 (describing “blacklists” of tenants named as 
defendants in eviction suits). 
359. See Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 110. 
360. Id.  
361. Id. at 112. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. at 108–09. 
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people’s lack of value in such a system364 will always create pockets of people who 
are ignored.365 Further, both contingency fees and fee-shifting statutes depend on 
successful outcomes,366 and much of the law is stacked against poor people’s 
success.367 Nonetheless, in combination with the public and public-private actors 
discussed above, private lawyers operating for-profit firms can play a contributing 
role. As I have argued elsewhere, for-profit representation can contribute economic 
power and independence to enforcement efforts.368 Reforms to support for-profit 
activity deserve consideration, and this section will provide a very brief sketch of 
how they might work.   
Legislation allowing tenants to aggregate claims could make contingency fees 
sufficient to attract counsel, because lawyers could bundle many “small value” 
claims together. An aggregate award for multiple plaintiffs might be enough to 
produce an attractive contingency fee even if each individual case would not. There 
is a robust literature exploring the civil procedure and ethics rules related to class 
action representation.369 For purposes of this Article, the key lesson from that 
literature is that in recent decades the Supreme Court has set an increasingly high 
bar for aggregating cases.370 Scholars argue that the bar has been set so high as to 
result in an overall decline in aggregate litigation and caused class action lawyers 
to consider reshaping their practices.371 Many of the legal violations poor people 
experience cannot be aggregated under current law.372 Policy analysts interested in 
market-based solutions could advocate for legislative reform to correct this area of 
doctrine. 
The other market-based option is to increase the availability of fee-shifting 
provisions. Consumer protection and antidiscrimination statutes that apply to some 
cases of substandard housing already include fee-shifting provisions, but the 
Supreme Court has made it difficult for private lawyers to rely on fee-shifting 
mechanisms for earnings. 373  This area is ripe for legislative correction. 
Additionally, in jurisdictions with consumer protection statutes that might not to 
apply to substandard rental housing, amendments could clarify or expand their 
applicability. If the consumer protection statutes lack robust fee-shifting 
provisions, those could be amended as well. Although fee-shifting amendments 
might not pass in the current U.S. Congress, states and localities enjoy broad 
authority to pass such laws in their own jurisdictions.  
                                                                                                                         
364. See supra Part III.A.1, 2. 
365. See CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 187, at 174–75, 196–97 (describing agendas of large and 
small firms). 
366. Contingency fees depend on winning monetary relief. See supra Part III.A.2. Fee-shifting 
requires that the plaintiff prevail. See supra Part III.A.3. 
367. See supra notes 233–235 and accompanying text (showing that poor tenants face obstacles to 
establishing liability and damages); see also Butler, supra note 168, at 2183 (“Deprivations associated with 
poverty are usually not ‘defenses’ to criminal liability. . . .”); id. at 2187–89 (summarizing the critique of 
rights launched by the critical legal studies movement and responses from critical race scholars). 
368. See Sabbeth, supra note 193, at 482–87.  
369. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern 
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373–74 (2005) (collecting literature). 
370. See Resnik, supra note 188, at 79. 
371. See, e.g., id. 
372. Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil 
Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531 (2016). 
373. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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Compared with aggregation, fee-shifting has the advantage of imposing the 
cost of enforcement on the bad actors, rather than taking the fee out of the recovery 
of the victims. This has heightened significance for the enforcement of poor 
people’s rights, as it allows lawyers to represent individuals regardless of the size 
of their monetary award. As discussed earlier, torts and contracts doctrines devalue 
the awards of poor people. 374  For this reason, fee-shifting is a particularly 
important tool for the enforcement of poor tenants’ rights.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article makes several contributions in the areas of enforcement theory, 
access to justice, poverty law, and housing. First, it highlights an enforcement gap 
between established doctrine and the lived reality of millions of people. Second, it 
demonstrates that the reason for the gap is the social position of those affected, 
revealing significant limitations of current approaches to enforcement of poor 
people’s rights. Finally, the Article offers a new approach to enforcement of 
housing standards. The proposal includes a combination of public and private 
elements that build on the strengths of each sector. It identifies specific ways to 
support enforcement of existing market actors and public agencies. It also includes 
a new idea: appointed counsel for affirmative representation of poor tenants.  
Up to this point, appointment of counsel has been available to poor people only 
when in a defensive position, but the Civil Right to Counsel Movement375 
See NAT’L COALITION FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL, http://civilrighttocounsel.org (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2019). 
has 
made enormous strides, and expansion deserves consideration. By contrasting the 
statutory right to counsel in affirmative litigation with other models of government 
investment, this Article offers a comparative framework that extends the existing 
literature and enhances ongoing policy discussions. While appointing counsel for 
tenants in substandard housing might sound expensive, it might be less so than 
other approaches to promoting affordable housing.376  
Compare Sabbeth, supra note 41, at 60–61, nn. 27–30 (collecting literature on costs of eviction defense 
lawyers), with Ryan Ori, Chicago’s Poorest Neighborhoods May be Transformed by Billions Invested in 135 
‘Opportunity Zones’, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/ryan-ori/ct-biz-
opportunity-zones-chicago-ryan-ori-20190401-story.html. 
In the United States today, a universal right to housing may not be feasible, 
and it is not recognized as the law. Yet poor tenants do have a collection of well-
established rights that can be realized. The civil justice system is stacked against 
poor people in many ways, but it also offers a multitude of protections hiding in 
plain sight. 
 
                                                                                                                         
374. See supra Part III.A.2. 
375. 
376. 
